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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the failure of a tenure conversion scheme introduced by
the government in New Delhi. The government introduced a leasehold to
freehold conversion scheme in response to a long standing demand from
leasehold residents, and to its own perception of the ineffectiveness of
leasehold restrictions. The story of the failure of the conversion scheme
reveals counter-intuitive responses from residents. Though residents had
long demanded freehold conversion, when the scheme was finally
introduced, few residents opted for conversion. Further, even though
residents chose not to convert to freehold ownership, they actively lobbied for
an indefinite extension of the government's deadline for conversion. This
thesis attempts to understand the apparently contradictory behavior of the
residents in their response to the government's conversion scheme.
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INTRODUCTION
In response to demand from residents in New Delhi, and its own perception
of the ineffectiveness of the residential leasehold system, the Indian
Government decided to introduce a leasehold to freehold conversion scheme.
Residents had been actively demanding the conversion option as early as the
Sixties, and the promise of allowing conversion had become a staple element
of the manifestos of successive governments since the late Seventies.
However, when the scheme was finally introduced in 1992, few residents
chose to convert to freehold tenure. This thesis tells the story of the leasehold
to freehold conversion scheme and attempts to understand the reasons for its
failure.
The Indian government distributed residential land to private individuals on
leasehold tenure in New Delhi to achieve housing affordability and to enable
control over land development. 1 A key objective of the leasehold system was
to control housing price escalation resulting from speculative investment in
the property market. The government imposed two kinds of restrictions on
the transfer of leasehold rights. The first restriction prohibited sales transfers
of leasehold housing for an initial period of ten years following allotment.
The second reduced returns from sales transfers after that period. The first
restriction attempted to prevent the transfer of subsidized housing to
ineligible groups, while the second attempted to reduce speculation by
reducing returns from investment in the property market.
1 Leasehold tenure involves a contractual relationship between lessor and lessee, where the
lessor owns the land, while the lessee owns the building and exercises land use rights. The lease
contract between lessor and lessee constrains lessees by limitations on land use, and on the
transfer of property.
Lessees, however, found ways to get around restrictions on sales transfers,
and make irregular transactions freely. Nearly all transfers of leasehold
property take place through a modified legal document known as the power
of attorney. The power of attorney transfer is not recognized as a legal sales
transfer by lease administration and does not give the buyer legal title to
property. Lessees claimed that they were forced to use the power of attorney
because of unreasonable restrictions on transfer. As the power of attorney did
not give them legal title, residents claimed that their freedom to invest in
their property was hampered. Lessees also claimed that lease restrictions on
land use and its interpretation by the lease adminstration caused them
unnecessary harrassment as they overlapped creating "dual control" with the
building regulations administered by the two municipal corporations of the
city. Leasehold residents therefore demanded that the government convert
the city's extensive residential leaseholds to freehold tenure.2
Subject to increasing political pressure, successive governments beginning in
the early Seventies, pushed Delhi's urban administration to reassess the
performance of the residential leasehold system. The "leasehold to freehold"
issue became a recurring feature in party manifestos for city elections. In
February 1992, the government announced a scheme to enable lessees to
convert their property to freehold ownership, conceding to the long standing
demand from residents. However, by July 1993, only 7.3% of eligible leasehold
residents had filed applications for tenure conversion.
Given the clamour for freehold conversion, the small percentage of residents
who actually chose to convert to freehold ownership is surprising. Why did
residents not convert, given their demand for freehold ownership? I attempt
to understand this question through interviews with leasehold residents,
2 Freehold tenure involves right to use and benefit from property, constrained by limitations on
use and density. The limitations are usually regulated by a building control act. Taxation on
sales transactions are common, and usually takes the form of a capital gains tax. The "unearned
increase" component required under leasehold tenure, however, is not applicable, nor can
restrictions on resale be imposed.
government officials, independent observers, and intermediaries involved in
the leasehold sub-market.
The structure of this thesis is as follows: Chapter 1 describes the institutional
and historical context of the residential leasehold in New Delhi, and the
reasons for its introduction. Arguments by residents demanding freehold
conversion and the government's response to this demand are also
introduced.
Chapter 2 describes the leasehold to freehold conversion scheme introduced
by the government and residents' responses to the scheme. The government
permits freehold conversion only with the payment of a one-time conversion
charge. Both residents and independent analysts suggest that the charge is too
high, and that this is the reason for the failure of the conversion scheme. I
outline the dispute over the conversion charge and show that the
government's determination of the conversion charge does not fully explain
the low response to the conversion scheme.
In Chapter 3, I examine why residents did not convert to freehold tenure. I
identify three primary reasons why residents did not convert. In the
Conclusion, I present recommendations that are suggested by an
understanding of the reasons for the residents' lack of interest in freehold
conversion. The Epilogue presents a theory about law and conflict that builds
from an analysis of the conflicts over property in the residential leasehold of
New Delhi.
Chapter 1
LEASE RESTRICTIONS IN NEW DELHI
The Indian government introduced the leasehold system in New Delhi to
control land prices and housing cost, and to ensure public sector control over
land and housing delivery. The continued growth of population in urban
centers in India has resulted in severe shortfalls in urban housing.3 The
growth in population has been greatest in the largest cities. New Delhi's
population doubled over a ten-year span from 700,000 in 1941 to over 1.4
million in 1951 (Ribiero, 1988). By 1961, the city's urban population had risen
to 2.3 million. The housing shortage at that time was assessed at 155,726 units
(Maitra, 1991). The supply of housing did not uniformly respond to demand.
In 1961, the Indian Census estimated that around 65 percent of households in
Delhi lived in one-room houses, while the richest 7 percent lived in large
houses. Informal housing stood at 78,346 in 1961, having increased from
12,749 units in 1951.
The Indian government's response to the increasing and imbalanced demand
for housing in New Delhi was characterized by three distinct approaches to
land development (Bose, 1968). In the first period (1947-55), following India's
independence and its partition in 1947, the government focused largely on
immediate measures to house refugees from former Indian territory. The
Ministry of Rehabilitation and Resettlement was specially set up by the Indian
government to build housing for the large influx of Hindu. refugees from
3 Present trends of urbanization indicate that housing will continue to be a major problem in
urban centers. India's urban population is expected to rise to 300 million by 2001: a ten-fold
increase this century (Ribiero, 1988).
newly formed Pakistan during this period. The second period (1955-59) was
characterized by a rapid population increase in Delhi, accompanying major
economic growth. The rising demand for housing was largely met by private
developers during this period. During the third period (1959 onwards), the
government introduced the "Scheme for the Large Scale Acquisition
Development and Disposal of Land" in 1961, and imposed restrictions on
private development.
By the end of the Fifties, the still underdeveloped private sector had failed to
satisfy the demand for housing. Maitra (1991), notes that only one major
private development agency had operated in New Delhi from 1947 to 1963.
During this period, this single agency accommodated a total of 13,063
households on 1,547.1 acres of developed residential land. At 934 plots a year,
the rate of development was slow when contrasted with the housing shortfall
in 1960 of 155,726.4 This developer's market included only the richest 7
percent of New Delhi's population. Moreover, with supply skewed towards
the wealthy, a bulk of the demand remained unsatisfied.
The government set up the Birla Committee in 1954 to address the mismatch
of supply and demand for housing. The Committee identified the haphazard
development of the city, with its resulting inadequate supply of land for
housing development, as the primary reason for this mismatch. The
Committee also noted that the previous governance of the city under the
Delhi Improvement Trust had failed because it had neither undertaken a
civic survey nor prepared a Master Plan for growth.5 As a result, the
Committee reported, "... (the) city grew haphazardly ... and land passed into
the hands of speculators." The Committee recommended an integrated urban
land policy as a remedy to the city's uncontrolled development. The Delhi
4 Plots developed by this agency during this period were large, with an average holding
measuring 600 square yards (Maitra, 1991).
5Ribiero (1988), refers to A.P. Hume's one-man committee report of 1936 as a first reference to
the rapid growth of the city, following its designation as India's capital in 1911, in terms of the
"congestion of people in houses and of houses on land". The Delhi Improvement Trust was set up
by the British in 1937, to "execute schemes for ameliorating living conditions". Government
land, known as "Nazul" land, was placed under the control of the Trust to further this intention.
Development Act of 1957 was a first attempt by the Indian government to
introduce this integrated policy. The Act of 1957 set up a single planning and
controlling authority known as the Delhi Development Authority (DDA), to
exercise executive control over Delhi's urban development. The "Scheme for
the Large Scale Acquisition, Development and Disposal of Land", introduced
by the government in 1961, laid the ground for government control over
urban development.
The Scheme of 1961 had three broad objectives. The first objective was to
ensure that increases in the value of land through the provision of
infrastructure and its conversion to urban use, would accrue to public benefit.
The second objective was to enable the city to develop in an "orderly" and
planned manner by ensuring public control over peripheral land. The third
objective was to achieve an equitable distribution of housing by public sector
land delivery (Negi, 1990). Land acquired by the administration under the
Scheme of 1961 was transferred to the DDA, which then subdivided and
distributed serviced land on leasehold tenure to private individuals and
institutions.
The government's shift to a new focus on public sector housing development
with restrictions on the operation of private developers in the city was also
heralded by the Scheme of 1961. This reflected a view that private investment
in the real estate market was motivated by speculation. Speculators rely on
supply scarcities created by withholding land from the market to maximize
profits. The government felt therefore, that private development would not
address housing shortfalls at an adequate rate (Ribiero, 1988). Speculative
investment in the housing market was also related to unaffordability of
housing. Some urban economists have argued that the land price increases
could be attributed to speculative withholding of land from the market.
Kumar (1989), for example, attributes rapid price increases for housing in
New Delhi to returns for speculative investment in land being significantly
higher than in the more "legitimate" share market.6 The government
6 Returns from investment in the real estate market over a thirty year period ending in the mid-
eighties was calculated at between 25% and 35%. Returns from the stock market were
significantly lower during the same period (Kumar, 1993).
attempted to make such speculation less profitable by introducing lease
restrictions on sales transfers.
In New Delhi, two leasehold restrictions were framed to control speculative
investment in public sector developed housing. The first prohibited all
transfers of leasehold rights for a period of ten years after initial allotment.
The second required that 50% of the unearned increase in value on property
sales after the initial ten-year holding period be returned as a capital gains tax.
Recognizing that property sales tended to be under-reported, the unearned
increase was determined by fixed rates corresponding to the city's
geographical quadrants, and particular housing types. The resulting reduction
in returns from property transactions through leasehold restrictions was
expected to control speculation in the housing market.
Leasehold tenure was first introduced in Delhi with Lutyens' plan for the
new capital of New Delhi in 1911. The Report of the Committee on
Administration of Land in Delhi (1977) notes that from 1911 to 1950, the
government administered land that was partly leasehold and partly freehold.
From 1950 onwards, the government chose to distribute land largely on
leasehold tenure. A Cabinet Committe set up in 1960 recommended in its
report of 1961 that all land acquired by the government in Delhi be distributed
only on leasehold tenure. All land acquired under the Scheme of 1961,
therefore, was disposed of in the form of 99-year perpetual leases (Ribiero,
1988).
The government distributed land on leasehold tenure for three purposes. The
first purpose was to ensure control over land use after the distribution of land
to private individuals. Building controls were built into the lease contract.
These building regulations were first introduced with the leases of 1911, at a
time when no other regulations on built form were in place. The second was
to generate a continuing revenue stream to the government through the
collection of lease (ground) rent on a bi-annual basis. A provision for the
periodic re-evaluation of lease rents was included in the lease contract to
reflect changes in land value. The third purpose was to collect a major
portion of land value increment generated by public infrastructural
investment, termed "unearned increase".7 This part of unearned increase
was to be collected at the time of transfer of leasehold rights.
The Case for Freehold Conversion
Though the government on one hand wanted to restrict sales transfers of
property to prevent speculation in the housing market, on the other it
attempted to encourage investment in housing by providing a quasi-
permanent character to leasehold tenure to ensure a perception of tenure
security. Policy makers in Delhi, were concerned that public ownership of
land not restrict private investment in housing. The distribution of land on a
leasehold basis was justified as being the nearest to freehold ownership in
that it provided "adequate incentive for the lessee to invest in housing"
(Ribiero, 1988). Leasehold conditions allowed private individuals to retain
50% of unearned increase in property value from sales transfers. Leases were
granted in perpetuity and the descendants of original lessees were by contract
given the option to renew the 99-year lease on its lapse. (Ribiero, 1988).
Land values, however, continued to rise rapidly for the land market of Delhi
as a whole after 1961. Kumar (1989) notes that land prices in the mid-eighties
for Central Delhi were 200 times higher relative to 1960, while prices for
South Delhi rose a thousand times. The wholesale price index, in contrast,
increased only by a factor of 5 during that same period. Real incomes also
grew at a much slower rate than formal housing cost. Housing had ironically
7 One justification for the leasehold system is that value in land is created by state intervention
through infrastructure provision (Archer, 1973). According to this view, the largest component
of increase in the value of private property then ensues not from the actions of the private
individual, but as a result of externalities generated by the actions of the state. The state, if
empowered to reclaim a proportion of the unearned increase in land value, can continue to
finance the development of infrastructure. Other forms of taxation such as the capital gains tax
and the betterment levy allow the collection of such unearned increase in land value. However,
public ownership of land offers the ability to reallocate that scarce resource to increase the
access of the poor to housing.
become more unaffordable in the years following the implementation of the
integrated land policy.8
MUD officials and the press attributed a large part of housing price escalation
to the failure of leasehold restrictions to control speculative transfers.
Irregular sales transfers of subsidized leasehold housing were high, indicating
that lease restrictions on transfer were largely ineffective. 9 As mentioned
earlier, these sales transfers were made through the use of a semi-legal
mechanism known as the power of attorney. One of two instruments that
comprises the power of attorney is the General Power of Attorney. This
instrument is a legal document that designates a representative selected by an
owner of any form of property to act on his or her behalf. The second
instrument used in the power of attorney transfer is a document known as
the Sales Agreement. The precise working of the power of attorney
transaction is explained in Chapter 3. At this point we need only be concerned
with the outcomes of one primary aspect of this irregular process of transfer.
In the power of attorney transaction of leasehold property, the title deed
remains in the name of the original lessee, as the government does not
recognize the transfer of leasehold rights as legal. The power of attorney
transfer then, does not constitute a legal sales transfer, and as a result does not
invite the registration charges and stamp duties associated with legal sales
transfers. The avoidance of these charges represents a major loss of revenue
for the urban administration.
8Recent findings indicate however, that the cost of housing in leasehold areas did not escalate
as rapidly as in comparable freehold areas in New Delhi. Data generated by primary surveys
by Negi (1991), and Mehra (1990), reveal price differentials ranging from 30% to 60% between
comparable residential leasehold and freehold property in New Delhi. Further research is
required before the nature of these price differentials across the two sub-markets is conclusively
established. Capozza and Sick (1991), refer to similar price differentials for comparable
leasehold and freehold residential property in Vancouver, Canada.
9 One survey of two schemes intended for the Economically Weaker Sections (EWS), revealed
that 38% of housing units in one were transferred from the beneficiaries of subsidized housing
allotments to ineligible buyers over an eight-year span. In another, 30.4% of these housing
allotments were transferred over a thirteen-year period (Selvasundar, 1989).
Power of attorney transactions became the rule, and nearly all transfers of
leasehold property were made through this mechanism. 10 Residents claimed
that lessees were forced to use the shelter of the power of attorney because of
the imposition of unrealistic restrictions on transfer.11 Those residents who
had acquired leasehold property through the power of attorney found access
to mortgages and bank loans using property as security difficult, as they had
no formal title to their property. As a result, they said their ability to invest in
housing was hampered.
With the subsequent setting up of the Municipal Corporations and the
introduction of the Building Code, lease regulations on built form overlapped
with the new Building Code. This overlap created some ambiguity as a result
of differences in interpretation by the lease administration and the municipal
corporations.12 As a result of the administrative overlap, extensions to
leasehold property required permission not only from the lease
administering body, but also from the municipal corporation. Permits for
even minor additions take up to a year for the lease administration to process.
Lessees also need to obtain clearance from the local municipal corporation for
the same additions. They claimed that the "dual control" by lease
administration and the municipal corporations was not only an unnecessary
overlap of administrative responsibility, but also caused a great deal of
10An editorial in the Times of India (3/13/91), notes, "Allowing conversion into freehold is, in
truth, merely accepting the reality. Leasehold land makes sense only if the state has the will
and the werewithal rigidly to control the parameters within which urban conglomerates
develop. With demand outstripping supply, and the municipal authorities unwilling to police
the land, virtually every single land law has been stood on its head. Leasehold land cannot be
sold with full legal sanctity but sales on power-of-attorney have become perfectly acceptable."
IIAn editorial in the Patriot (2/17/92) referring to the use of power of attorney to transfer
property notes, " ... a person is often forced to sell off his property under various compulsions and
indirect methods were resorted to because the conditions attached to dwelling units were
unacceptable or impractical."
12Delhi is administered by two municipal corporations, the Municipal Corporation of Delhi
(MCD), which provides services to Old and Central Delhi. The New Delhi Municipal
Corporation (NDMC) administers the rest of New Delhi.
inconvenience and confusion to residents. 13 They also claimed that the
numerous lease restrictions exposed them to demands from "rent-seeking"
lease administration officials. 14 Lessees therefore demanded that the
government convert the leasehold system to a freehold ownership system.
Subject to increasing political pressure, successive governments pushed
Delhi's urban administration to evaluate the performance of the residential
leasehold system (Editorial, Times of India, 3/13/91). The Committee on
Administration of Land in Delhi was set up in 1977 to "examine the working
of the leasehold system ... [and] ... the feasibility of converting the leasehold
system to freehold" (Government of India, 1977: ii).
The Committee notes in the introduction to its report:
The Government of India has often been pressed to
convert the leasehold system on Government owned land
in Delhi/New Delhi to a freehold system. In recent times
citizen dissatisfaction over the multiplicity of authorities
dealing with land and its administration, including the
administration of leases granted by Government from
time to time, has also been rather vocal. (Government of
India, 1977: 1).
The Committee goes on to add:
13A government document of 1977 quotes an earlier government missive which supports the
lessees' position. It notes, "Being couched in legal terms, as the leases are, they are capable of
different interpretations leading to a lot of confusion. Besides the leases provide for approval
of the lessor to the construction whereas legitimately speaking this is the function of the local
body" (Government of India, 1977: 4). The lease contract reserves lease administration's right to
terminate the contract for any infringement of its terms. This termination of the contract by
lease administration is referred to as lease "determination".
14 In apparent concurrance with this criticism, a government document notes, "The leasehold
system causes a great deal of harassment and inconvenience to the lessees largely stemming not
from the system, but from the administration of it." (Government of India, 1977: 5). A further
reference in the same document is more direct, "One [reason for dissatisfaction with the
leasehold system] relates to the annoyance generated by inefficient official procedures, which
necessitate repeated visits to Government Offices, frequent payments, explanations for petty
infringements, and perhaps the satisfaction of illegitimate or corrupt demands." (Government
of India, 1977: 5).
There is at present a great deal of dissatisfaction with the
leasehold system in Delhi. There are several reasons for
this. One relates to the annoyance generated by inefficient
official procedures, which necessitates repeated visits to
Government Offices, frequent payments, explanations for
petty infringements, and perhaps the satisfaction of
illegitimate or corrupt demands. Another arises out of the
reluctance of lessees to let their lease rents rise as time
passes and leases become due for reassessment,
particularly if such rises have a suspicion of arbitrariness.
A third cause of resentment is the failure of the leasehold
system in Delhi to provide any restraint on land prices or
on speculation in land, as had been expected of it.
(Government of India, 1977: 9)
The Committee however recommended that the leasehold system be
retained, observing that it still demonstrated three distinct advantages over
the freehold system. The first advantage was greater control over land use
through lease regulations. The second was the revenue earned as unearned
increase and ground rent, which was used to finance further urban
development. The third was its use to increase housing affordability to the
poor.15 The Committee noted that there was need for caution in making a
decision to dismantle the leasehold system, for while the leasehold system
could be dismantled at any time, reversing such a decision would be difficult
for administrative and political reasons.
The Committee's recommendation appears to have been ignored, for in that
same year, Prime Minister Morarji Desai's Janata government announced its
1 5 In favor of the leasehold system, the Committee cited first, its use to control land use as a
factor justifying its retention, as the "leasehold system offers an authority interested in the
observance of a land use regulation an additional weapon, and a fairly potent one, to combat
violations" (Government of India, 1977: 11). It identified as a second advantage the
"opportunity it offers the community to share in the value of land over time" through the
collection of unearned increase. In addition, the recurring income to Government by way of
ground rent, additional ground rent, periodical revision of ground rent and charges recovered for
regularization of breaches of the terms of leases, was "revenue the Government coud ill-afford
to forego" (Government of India, 1977: 12-13). Total revenue from such charges collected during
1977, for instance, by the Land and Development Office, was Rs. 40.378 million against an
expenditure of Rs. 2.287 million (Source: L&DO Records).
decision to convert New Delhi's residential leasehold land to freehold
tenure. 16 No attempt was made however, to implement the policy by this
government or the succeeding Congress-I governments under Prime
Ministers Indira Gandhi or Rajiv Gandhi. In 1989, the Rajiv Gandhi
Government raised the conversion issue again, but the policy remained
unimplemented. An article in the Indian Express (12/6/87) notes,
"Conversion of leasehold land to freehold land was one of the promises held
out in the Congress-I manifesto. 'In fact that is a promise held out in every
election', an official said. But it has so far been a case of political push being
resisted by administrative pressure."
In 1991, the Janata government under Prime Minister Chandrasekhar
introduced a scheme for the conversion of residential leaseholds to freehold.
However, an official notification was not issued, and the scheme remained
unimplemented. The short-lived Chandrasekhar government was soon
replaced by a Congress government in the same year.
The Times of India (1/11/92), reports a meeting between the Union Minister
of Urban Development and a delegation from the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP),
the government's major political opposition in Delhi. The BJP members
reminded the minister of her party's electoral promise that the leasehold
system would be abolished by January 1992. The delegation was quoted as
saying that a consultative committee set up to discuss the issue had been
assured that the dismantling of the leasehold system would be the
government's "new year gift" to the people of Delhi. However, the delegation
noted, no official announcement had yet been made.
16Agrawal (1994), notes that the Minister of State for Urban Development, Sikhandar Bakht,
announced the government's intention in Parliament in that year.
Chapter 2
THE LEASEHOLD TO FREEHOLD CONVERSION SCHEME
On February 15, 1991, the Congress government under Narasimha Rao,
announced its decision to offer freehold conversion to residents of leasehold
property with the payment of a one-time conversion charge. This time, an
official notification was issued, confirming the government's decision to
phase out the residential leasehold system. Three factors were cited by the
government as prompting the decision to allow freehold conversion. First,
the uncontrolled spiraling of housing prices indicated a failure of its land
management strategy. Second, the costs of maintaining leasehold accounts
exceeded the revenue earned as rent. MUD officials noted that the costs of
maintaining lease administration exceeded returns from ground rents.17 The
widespread use of the power of attorney to effect property transactions
represented further revenue losses as a result of the avoidance of unearned
increase, and registration charges and stamp duties. And third, housing
investment was said to have suffered as a result of fears regarding tenure
security.
The conversion scheme was expected to achieve three objectives. First, to
eliminate wasteful effort in collecting small amounts of ground rent from a
large number of lessees on a bi-annual basis, as costs outstrip recovery.
Second, the regulatory authority invested in DDA and L&DO by the lease
17 The Indian Express (12/6/87) reports, "One of the factors taken into account in reviewing the
leasehold system has been the cost of maintaining offices to keep lease accounts and records.
'The cost wipes out much of the benefit', an official said". MUD's Land and Development Office
(L&DO), for example, recovered 35.7% of ground rent due in 1987, and only 23.2% in 1988
(Source: L&DO Records).
contract created an overlap of control with that of the municipal corporations,
therefore, DDA and L&DO were to be divested of these regulatory duties to
allow them to function in their new role of "a facilitator and developer of
infrastructure for future development". Third, to augment revenue to the
DDA to enable the purchase and development of land stock to meet future
needs (The Economic Times, 3/14/93).
A Ministry of Urban Development notification stated that conversion to
freehold tenure devolved additional rights from the property rights bundle to
private individuals. Lessees therefore, were expected to pay for the additional
rights. Freehold conversion was to be allowed on the payment of a
conversion charge, fixed according to sectoral location (zone), and housing
type.18 By allowing the conversion of leasehold property to freehold tenure,
the government gives up the right to collect "unearned increase" from future
property transactions. The conversion charge, was intended to partly
compensate the urban administration for the potential loss of revenue as a
result of conversion to freehold tenure. MUD estimated that revenue from
conversions would total Rs. 6 billion (US$ 200 million).19 The government
announced that this revenue would be directed to a revolving fund that
would be used to acquire and develop land, with the focus this time around,
on private sector housing development. 20
18 For example, conversion charges were fixed at Rs. 30,000 (roughly US$ 1,000) for plots sized
150 sq. yds. Lessees were given the option of staggering payment over 5 years, at an interest rate
compounded at 12% p.a. The Hindustan Times (2/17/92) reports, " ... the conversion charges are
fixed on an incremental basis on the lines of the income-tax formula (this presumably means
that the charges are progressive -- parentheses are mine), with the variations in land value
reflected in the zone-wise categorization of the various types of flats and houses in Delhi. The
Urban Development Minister Mrs. Sheila Kaul has done well to clarify that the conversion
charges have been computed on the basis of the notified land rates obtaining in 1987-88 and not
the enhanced rates announced subsequently."
191 US$ = Rupees (Rs.) 31.13, as of 12/30/93 (Source: The New York Times).
2 0 The government felt that the DDA, in attempting to fulfill its role as the major developer of
housing, had found itself unequal to the task. The DDA had continued to fall behind in its
allotment targets over the years since 1961 (Howland, 1975, notes that according to MUD
guidelines, one-fifth of total DDA-built housing was to be supplied to the Higher Income Group
(HIG) so that the Lower Income Group (LIG) could be cross-subsidized. However, subsequent
assessments revealed that land allotment skewed heavily toward the upper half of the
Government officials felt that freehold conversion was a necessary
prerequisite to achieve this private sector oriented strategy. Officials noted
that shortfalls in total housing had caused the rapid escalation in housing cost
in Delhi. These supply shortfalls, they said, had resulted from excessive public
sector involvement in housing delivery, and from restrictions on the
operation of private developers. Leasehold restrictions had distorted the
operation of the housing market, they claimed, and their removal would
promote increased housing development by increasing the fluidity of the
land market. A New Delhi newspaper, the "Hindustan Times", notes in an
editorial titled "From lease set free":
The government should be congratulated for the overdue
reform, which recognizes not only the failure of the
leasehold system to curb speculation and ease the housing
shortage but the need to tailor the structure of ownership
to suit the requirements of the growing metropolis, where
the accent has shifted from official to private and
cooperative efforts. (Hindustan Times, 2/17/92)
Given this logic, and the demand from residents, the government and other
observers expected a flood of applicants with the announcement of the
scheme.21
The first deadline set by the government notification of 2/15/92 for the filing
of applications for freehold conversion was March 31, 1992. In July, 1992, the
"Patriot", a New Delhi-based newspaper reported that the DDA had sold
22,000 application forms, but received only 1100 completed applications from
a total eligible population of 200,000. The L&DO sold 2,300 forms to an eligible
population of 60,000, and were returned 225 applications. In all, between the
DDA and the L&DO, a total of 1325 applications were received, accounting for
market. Jha (1984), notes that till 1982, 47.1% of land had been auctioned to the HIG, while the
LIG received only 20.9%.
21The "Patriot", in an editorial titled: "End of an anomaly", notes, "The Union cabinet's
decision to allow conversion of leasehold plots of (upto) 500 sq. m. into freehold land in Delhi
for a fee is a welcome step. It will help housing and benefit lakhs of people owning Janata, low-
income, middle-income group flats, the self-financed DDA-built apartments and the
cooperative group housing societies" (The Patriot, 2/17/92).
just 0.51% of total eligible lessees. In contrast to the expectations surrounding
the introduction of the scheme, the actual response was surprisingly meagre.
Why did this occur?
The Contradiction of Compulsion: From Compulsory Leasehold to
Compulsory Freehold
The government attributed the minimal response from residents to the fact
that the last date for the filing of applications had allowed lessees inadequate
time to prepare the necessary documents (The "Patriot", 7/12/92). A
notification dated February 26th, 1992 was issued by MUD, extending the last
date for filing applications by a year. R.K. Bhargava, Secretary, MUD,
announced at a public forum that the last date for the payment of conversion
fees was now extended from March 31, 1992 to March 31, 1993, in response to
"people's demands" (Hindustan Times, 2/27/92).
In order to speed up the conversion process, the government insisted that
conversion to freehold tenure would be compulsory for residential plots
smaller than 150 square yards in area.22 Two primary reasons prompted the
government's decision. One, to generate immediate revenue, and two, to free
itself from the responsibility of leasehold administration. Properties smaller
than 150 sq. yds. account for over 70% of all leasehold properties in Delhi. If
all these properties were converted immediately, urban administration
would have divested itself at one stroke of a large part of its responsibilities
with regard to lease administration (Agrawal, 1993). Probably of more
importance in the government's decision however, was the significant source
of revenue that immediate conversion would have generated for future
urban development.
22According to the official notification of February 15, 1992, conversion to free-hold tenure was
made compulsory for plots smaller than 150 sq m and optional for plots sized between 150 and
500 sq. yds.. An editorial in the Hindustan Times (2/17/92) notes, "While this is obviously
meant to ensure greater response to the conversion offer, there is little justification for making it
compulsory for certain categories, which is a major departure from the scheme announced last
year. The stipulation that all built-up plots of up to 150 sq. yds. must be converted to freehold,
while it is optional for the rest ... is likely to be viewed as discriminatory."
Lessees however questioned the legitimacy of the administration's attempt to
enforce compulsory conversion. 23 A consumer protection organization,
Common Cause Society, decided to take the issue to the courts. H.D. Shourie,
Director of Common Cause, notes in an article in the Hindustan Times
(2/21/93):
When the leasehold rights were given ... [to residents] ...
no stipulation had been made in the lease agreements that
the lessee will be compulsorily required at a subsequent
stage to get the leasehold converted into freehold
Where the lessee is not selling the property, where the
family living in it is content with the original stipulation
of 99 years' lease, ... and particularly where the lessee is
not in a position to afford the money required for
conversion, how can he be compelled to get it done? If he
does not want to seek conversion, or if he cannot afford it,
and within 60 days he does not apply for the conversion,
will the government throw him out of the property he
built say 20 years ago?24
Other residents' associations joined Common Cause in opposing the
government's attempt to impose compulsory conversion. The Apex
Association of DDA colonies filed a writ petition in the Delhi High Court
requesting that freehold conversion be optional for all residents.25
2 3 Tyler (1990) explains why people obey law from a normative perspective, which assumes
that compliance is based on perceptions of morality and legitimacy. According to Tyler,
conformance to law that is perceived as just is commitment through "morality". Conformance as
a result of a perception that authority enforcing law has the right to dictate behavior, is
termed commitment through "legitimacy" (Tyler, 1990: 4).
2 4 Agrawal (1994), notes that according to Indian law, physical possession is "three-fourth
title". Law is heavily skewed in favor of tenants where conflict with owners occurs. In the
event that urban administration 'determines' a lease contract, at most the resident can be
declared illegal, but the administration does not have the legal power to evict residents.
Indian legal procedure and its interpretation by law insist that no one can be rendered homeless.
2 5 Residential apartment buildings with more than four apartments, are required by the
Apartment Ownership Act of 1986, to be represented by a residents' association. All DDA
housing comes under the purview of this . All DDA residents associations are registered with
the Apex Association of DDA Colonies, and their members have automatic membership of the
Surprised by the response from the residents, an open forum was held on
26th February, 1992 by the government to invite public discussion on the
conversion policy (See Illustration 1).26 R.K. Bhargava, Union Urban
Development Secretary, stated at the meeting that the open forum had been
organized to listen to suggestions from residents on how the modalities of the
scheme should be worked out, so that "it causes least inconvenience to the
beneficiaries" (Hindustan Times, 2/27/92). At the forum attended by a few
hundred people, the compulsory conversion clause in the official notification
was frequently referred to by members of the audience. One resident took to
the dais to say: "What will the government give me if I pay up. And what
will it do if I refuse to pay anything?" (Hindustan Times, 2/28/92). The
Hindustan Times, which covered the event, notes that the audience cheered
in response to the question, and demanded an answer from Bhargava.
Bhargava replied that the issue would be noted, and a decision would be
taken at a later time. The audience refused to be satisfied until he conceded:
"If somebody does not want conversion, we have to consider such an
eventuality" (Hindustan Times, 2/28/92).
The case disputing the government's right to impose compulsory conversion
was slated for a hearing before the division bench of the Delhi High Court on
3rd March, 1993. Residents Associations requested that a "stay" be granted on
the conversion scherne.27 Fearing that the High Court would grant the stay
and effectively halt the implementation of the conversion scheme, the
government despatched a representative early in the morning of that day to
the presiding judge to inform him that the conversion scheme was now
optional. The Hindustan Times reported that day, that according to a
larger body. The Apex Association therefore represents the interests of all residents of DDA
housing.
2 6 Agrawal (1993), notes that the open forum was a first attempt by the Indian government to
invite public participation in shaping its decisions.
2 7 A "stay" or injunction, is a temporary freeze on the implementation of government law that is
under dispute for normative reasons. A court of law hearing such a case may in some cases where
there appears to be sufficient justification, grant a stay until it takes a decision on the
appropriateness of such law. The granting of a stay is in itself considered a moral victory for
the party requesting the stay (Agrawal, 1994).
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Illustration 1
Source: The Patriot, New Delhi, February 25, 1992
MUD notification, conversion of flats and built-up land plots measuring up
to 150 sq. yards was now optional, (Hindustan Times, 3/3/93).
At the forum held on the 26th of February, the Union Urban Development
Secretary noted that the conversion rates would remain static until March
1993, but would be raised after that deadline (Times of India, 2/28/92).
Common Cause, while filing a case questioning the constitutional validity of
the freehold conversion policy, asked that the last date for filing applications
be further extended to enable residents enough time to complete the
necessary paperwork and arrange for the necessary finance (The Pioneer,
12/18/92). MUD was directed by the High Court to consider extending the last
date for filing applications beyond March 31 1993.
The deadline for filing applications was again extended. By July, 1993,
however, of a total 260,000 eligible households, only a little under 7.3% had
filed for conversion.28
I attempted to find through my fieldwork in New Delhi over the summer of
1993 why the conversion scheme had met with such a poor response. Could
conversion charges have been too high? The political opposition,
independent observers, residents' associations, and even most government
officials are in agreement that the government's determination of the
conversion charge is the reason for the low response. I found, however, that
the determination of the conversion charge cannot fully explain why such a
small percentage of eligible leasehold residents chose to apply for freehold
conversion.
High Conversion Charges
Most sources in the government, independent analysts, residents and the
political opposition in New Delhi clearly feel that the conversion charge is
too high and the only cause for the poor response to the scheme.
2 8 Percentages calculated from L&DO and DDA records of total applications received.
MUD officials when interviewed, said that conversion charges were
progressive, increasing with the income group of lessees, and provided
residents additional tenure security at a highly discounted rate. Why then,
they asked, would lessees not pay for the benefit of owning their own homes?
In private however, most government officials admit that conversion charges
are fixed too high (Banerji, 1993, et al).
Independent observers stress this assessment. One analyst notes:
"The main reason for the obvious failure of the scheme is
the fixation of somewhat high and arbitrary rates of
conversion." (Gopal Sharma in the Statesman, 11/6/92).
An analysis in the Economic Times (3/14/93), notes that there is little
economic incentive for lessees to change from leasehold to freehold tenure.
Like other independent analyses, this assessment focuses on a comparison
between lease rent or "ground rent" payable over the life of the lease under
leasehold tenure and the charge applicable for conversion to freehold
tenure. 29 The assessment illustrates its case with the example of a 520 square
yard plot in Geetanjali Enclave, leased in 1973. The plot commands a
premium of Rs. 13,000, with an annual ground rent liability of Rs. 131. The
assessment notes that if the lessee compounds his lease return on a one-year
deposit with a commercial bank at the prevailing 1992 interest rate of 12
percent, the amount of a permanent deposit required would be Rs. 1091.66.
2 9 The ground rent for residential properties is fixed as a percentage of the premium laid down
at the time of allocation of land. This percentage varies from one to two-and-a-half percent
depending on the type of leasehold property. The assessment of ground rent has varied over the
years as a reflection of rising land costs. For residential land sold in the early seventies, the
sales price of plots ranged between Rs. 200-300 per square yard. Property in areas such as
Lajpatnagar in South Delhi, sold at the rate of Rs. 200 per sq. yd. The ground rent in this case
was assessed at an annual of one rupee per square yard. For a plot leased ine Geetanjali Enclave
in 1973, the ground rent was assessed at Rs. 131 per sq. yd. As ground rents have never been
revised since initial assessments, such major disparities have persisted (Economic Times,
3/14/93). The lease contract entitles the government to make periodic rent revisions every 30
years during the term of the lease. Agrawal (1993), notes that such rent revision was not made
in the past, even though lease administration was presented with two opportunities to do so.
He attributes lease administration's reluctance to revise ground rent to its political
unpopularity.
The one-time conversion charge payable to the DDA, calculated according to
government's conversion formula (see Illustration 2), would be:
Conversion charge = (32.5 x R) + (0.2 x R x P - 350)
where,
Area of plot = 520 square yards = 435 square meters
P = Plot area in square meters
R = Land rate in Rs. per square meter as fixed by the notification for
residential properties
Conversion charge = (32.5 x 3600) + (0.2 x 3600 x 435-350)
= 117,000 + 61,200
= Rs. 178,200
This example however, is clearly an inappropriate one. Under the present
conversion scheme, plots larger than 500 square yards are not eligible for
freehold conversion. A second example is a more accurate illustration of this
analyst's case. This time a 900 square foot flat is considered.
This flat sold by the DDA in another locality, Sarita Vihar, commanded a sales
price of Rs. 138,000 in 1985. The lease rent in this case was fixed at Rs. 203 per
annum. For the lessee of this flat, the bank deposit required to meet the
liability of lease rent in perpetuity at an interest rate of 12% p.a. is Rs. 1691.66.
The one-time conversion charge determined by the DDA, however, is Rs.
25,000. The analyst concludes that for the lessee who has no intention to sell
his or her property, or redevelop it, there can be no incentive to change land
tenure.
H.D. Shourie of Common Cause notes that the average conversion charge of
Rs. 30,000 is for the middle class lessee, high and not in immediate reach
(Hindustan Times, 2/21/92). V.V. Saranathan, Chairman of the Apex
Association of DDA colonies, finds the rates of conversion "far too high"
(Hindustan Times, 2/23/92). This position is echoed by the political
opposition. The BJP's city unit president, V.K. Malhotra, notes that the fee
that the government wants for allowing conversion of their leased land into
Rates of conversion
int'o freehold
These are the conversion rates decided by the Union govcrnment
for conversion of their leased land into freehold in Delhi. Convcrsion
is compulsory for all flats and tenements and for built-os plots upto
150 sq.m. Those owning a flat on power-of-attorney froi the original
lessee will have to pay a 33.3 per cent surchage on the convcrsion
fee applicable. The detailed terms of wherc and how to apply will bc
gazetted within 60 days.
(A) For plots:
Plot area is Conversion Fee to be calca- Formula for calculat-
Sq. Mtrs lated on the following basis ing conversion fee
Upto 50 Nil Nil
Above 50 7.5% of notified land rate ,075 x R x (P-50)
upto 150 per Sq. Mtr for area above 50 Sq. Mtrs. -
Above 150 and Conversion charges applicable (7.5 x R) plus
upto 250 to 150 Sq. Mtrs. plus 10% fO.l x R x (P-150)]
of notified land rate per Sq. Mtr. for
area above 150 Sq. Mtrs.
Above 250 and Conversion charge applicable (175 x R) plus
upto 350 for 250 Sq. Mtrs. plus 15% "0.15- R x (P-250))
of notified land rate per Sq. Mir.-for
area above 250 Sq. Mtrs.
Above 350 and Conversion charge applitable -132.S x R) plus
upto 500 for 350 Sq. Mtr. plus 20% 102 x R x (P-350)]
of notified land rate per Sq.area above 350 Sq. Mtrf
P - Plot area in Sq. Mir.
R - Land rates for residential purposes in rupees per .a mir. as notified by the
Ministry of Urban Development. For the period upt 11.3.1992 the conversion
charges would be calculated on the land rates notifiec ly the Ministr of Urban
Development w.e.f 1.4.1987 vide their letter -No. J-22011 /4/7-LD. dated
1.6.1987 (Annex-C). For the period beyond 31.3.1992 the notified land rates
applicable for calculating the conversion charges would be those prevailing on
the date of conversion.
fFor areas where rates have not been notified by the Ministry of Urban
- .. evelopment. the residential land rates notified by the Delhi Development
Authority for the area would be applicablel
(B) For Tenements leased by Land and Development Office
Category of East North/West South Central
Tenements Zone Zone Zone Zone
1. 'C' type Nil Nil Nil Nil
tenements
2. 'A' type tenements
i) First Floor 3,0009.000 12,000 15.000
ii) Ground Floor 4.25012,750 17,000 21.250
or flats/tenements allotted by Delhi Development Authority and its Slum Wing on
easehold basis:
Category of East Zone North/ South Central
flats/temenb West Zone Zone Zone
Junta Nil Nil Nil Nil
LIG 0 3.000 9.000 12.000 15.000
MIG/SFS(1) 4.250 12.750 17.00& 21.250
type-Il
SFS(H1)/HIG/ 6,250 18,750 25,000 31.250
Type-ll-A/
Type-Il-B.
SFS(III) 7.500 22.500 ' 0,000 37.500(C) For flats coestracted by Groep Housing Societies land allotted by Delhi
Development Authority:
..Ptlath area East North/ . South Central
of flat/tenement Zone West Zone -- Zone Zone
Below 30 Sq. Mtr.
Nil Nil Nil Nil
Above 30 and upto 3.000 9.000 12.000 15.000
50 Sq. Mire.
Above 50 and upto 4.250 12.750 17.000 21.250
'5 Sq Mtrs.
Above '5 and upto 6.250 18.750 25.000 31.250
100 Sq Mirs
Above 100 and upto 7.500 22.500 30.000 37.500
125 Sq. Mirs
Above 125 Sq Mirs See (D) below
(D) For flats:,enements of Group Housing Societies on land leased by Delhi
Development Authonty of piinth area exceeding 125 Sq. Mirs. the conversion
charges would be on tihe basis of the formula given in Para 1.4 above. The pl
area would be Jeemed 1o be 1 2 x Pltnth Area of the flat.
Illustration 2
Source: The Times of India, New Delhi, February 17, 1992
freehold is far too high". Malhotra goes on to warn that if the government
did not revise the conversion charge, the party would have to "plan some
form of action" (Times of India, 2/18/92).
Dispute over the Method of Determining the Conversion Charge
Residents, independent analysts and the political opposition contest the
government's determination of conversion charge on the basis of market
rates of land. They suggest that the charge be determined on the basis of the
ground rent payable over the remaining life of the lease. However, the
administration does not accept such a determination.
The relationship of the government's conversion charge to the ground rent is
frequently made by sources outside of the government. These sources choose
to refer to the government determined conversion charge in terms of
multiples of annual ground rent. The Patriot (2/18/92) quotes the BJP's
reference to the conversion charge as "100 to 1000 times the lease money"
(ground rent). This relationship is clearly made to set up their alternative
proposal.
The BJP City Unit President, V.K. Malhotra, describes the official conversion
scheme as a "fraud on the people", for the government requires that residents
pay more than the ground rent payable over the remaining life of the lease
(Times of India, 2/18/92). The BJP suggests three modifications to the official
scheme. First, that residents be charged a flat rate equivalent to ten times the
annual ground rent. Second, that the market rates of land not be used to
determine the conversion charge. Third, owners of slum colony homes and
plots be given freehold rights for a flat sum (presumably a nominal one).
From the side of the residents, the Secretary General of the Apex Association
of DDA colonies, G. S. Sharma, notes that if the government charges ten
times the annual ground rent for conversion, the annual interest on the
amount collected will be more than the ground rent (Indian Express, 2/26/92).
Sharma is quoted as saying at the open forum held on the 26th of February,
1992, "ground rent should be the basis for calculation ... [of the conversion
charge]. The government can charge 10 times the ground rent for conversion"
(The Times of India, 2/28/92). The equation of conversion charges to ground
rent recurs through public discussion on the conversion rates. Other
proposals recommend a conversion charge ranging from ten to twenty times
the ground rent. It is noted that capitalization of an amount equivalent to ten
times ground rent equals total ground rent payable over the life of the lease.
The Economic Times' assessment referred to earlier, recommends that the
tenure conversion charge be limited to the amortization of the ground rent
(Economic Times, 3/14/93). This analysis notes that the amortization of
ground rent requires its multiplication by a factor of 8.33. The analysis notes
that a further margin may be added if the government also wishes to be
compensated for potential revenue loss from future ground rent revisions.
The conversion charge would then need to be fixed at ten times the current
ground rent valuation (Economic Times, 3/14/93).
Sharma explains this linkage of conversion charges to the amortization of the
ground rent. He refers to the example of earlier precedents. He notes that an
amount equal to ten times the annual property tax was collected when the
government decided to stop an annual collection of the tax, and an amount
calculated in a similar way was substituted for the annual road tax payment
(Indian Express, 2/26/92). The implication of the parallels drawn by Sharma is
clear. The government suffers a loss of revenue by giving up its right to
collect ground rent when it allows freehold conversion. Sharma feels that a
fair determination of the conversion charge must reflect only this potential
revenue loss.
MUD officials, however, dispute this interpretation linking the conversion
charge to the amortization of the ground rent. They point out that by
allowing conversion to freehold tenure, the government not only gives up its
right to collect ground rent, but also transfers rights additional to those
guaranteed under the lease contract. They note that freehold ownership gives
residents greater security of tenure than under leasehold ownership, and
allows residents additional rights such as the right to transfer property. By
allowing the right to transfer property without restriction, they say, the
administration also gives up the right to collect "unearned increase", at the
time of property transfer. The urban administration, they contend, must be
compensated not only for ground rent payable, but also for the loss of
potential revenue from "unearned increase". Parallels such as those that
Sharma draws to schemes for the capitalization of property taxes, they say, are
therefore inappropriate, as no such loss of additional revenue is involved.
Leasehold residents, however, ignore this argument. H.D. Shourie of
Common Cause notes that for the average middle class lessee, the charge for
conversion is not commensurate with the benefit provided by the additional
freehold rights "for which he does not consider any imperative need"
(Hindustan Times, 2/21/92). In filing a case in the New Delhi High Court
disputing the "unfair" conversion charge on behalf of Common Cause,
Shourie questioned the constitutional validity of the freehold conversion
policy, claiming that it was "misconceived" and the conversion rates
"exorbitant" (The Pioneer, 12/18/92). In insisting that the government lower
the conversion charge, Shourie takes a more extreme view:
"Law abiding people preferred to purchase land or flat on
leasehold than to buy unauthorized land. Unauthorized
colonies have been regularized and are freehold, while
law abiding citizens have to pay huge amounts for
conversion. Why should any conversion charge be paid at
all? " (Economic Times, 6/28/92).
In July 1993, a total of 13 different cases contesting various aspects of the
conversion charge were pending in the Delhi High Court (Agrawal, 1993).
These disputes over the conversion charge remain unresolved at the time of
writing. The official explanation, then, is that the low response to the
conversion scheme can be attributed to expectations that the conversion
charge will be lowered. A decision on the success or failure of the conversion
scheme, government officials say, must await the High Court's decision on
whether the conversion charge should be lowered and how it should be
determined. In the following section, I show that the high conversion charge
cannot fully explain why residents did not convert to freehold ownership.
Did Residents Not Convert Only Because the Conversion Charge was Too
High?
Not all leasehold residents are required to pay a conversion charge.
Conversion for lessees of LIG and EWS property measuring less than 50 sq.
yds. can be effected without the payment of a conversion charge (see
Illustration 2).30 Residents of these properties are also exempt from a
surcharge normally applicable to residents who have acquired property
through the power of attorney (Government of India, 1992). If the reason for
the low response to the conversion scheme was that the conversion charge
was too high, those eligible for free conversion should show a significantly
higher response rate than those required to pay a conversion charge.
I compare total applications from both DDA and L&DO properties to total
eligible applicants from both lease administrations. 31 The number of
applications received in each group is compared to total eligible applicants, to
reveal the percentage of conversion for both groups. While percentage of
applications for DDA administered leaseholds is 7.9%, conversions for the
L&DO stands at 5.23% (refer Table 2). Comparison of the percentage of free
conversions against total conversion percentages for DDA and L&DO
administrations proves to be more difficult. Data entry and the maintenance
of records at the Conversion Cell of the L&DO, and at the DDA, continues to
be by hand. As significant man-hours are involved in tabulation, breakdown
3 0An application and processing fee totalling Rs. 250 (approximately US$ 8) is payable to the
government even for the "free" conversions.
3 1 The residential leasehold system in urban Delhi is maintained by three administrations.
First, leases administered by the DDA, introduced in 1961 by the Scheme for the Large Scale
Acquisition, Development and Disposal of Land. Second, leases administered by the Land and
Development Office (L&DO). These leases were transferred from0 the Ministry of
Rehabilitation and Resettlement, which was set up specifically to house refugees from
Pakistan following India's partition in 1947. Most of the resettlement colonies were developed
in the second half of the fifties and transferred to allottees on leasehold tenure. On the
dismantling of the Ministry in 1957, these leases were transferred to the L&DO, a department
within MUD. Third, the historical leaseholds introduced in 1911 by Lutyens' plan for New
Delhi. These leaseholds are administered by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD).
by category is not maintained. 32 To minimize the problem of manual
tabulation, I select one particular area for analysis rather than the entire
administration. Lajpatnagar, an L&DO administered leasehold area in South
Delhi is selected, as it is at present one of Delhi's most rapidly changing land
markets. Land values in Lajpatnagar have risen at a higher rate in recent
years than other areas in Delhi.
Lajpatnagar was developed by the Ministry of Rehabilitation and
Resettlement to house Punjabi refugees from Pakistan (mostly Hindus), lease
maintenance for Lajpatnagar was transferred to the newly set up Land and
Development Office (L&DO) in 1957. In recent years with rising demand,
better infrastructural linkage has meant that land prices in South Delhi have
changed more rapidly than in others (see Chapter 1). As a result, Lajpatnagar,
once predominantly a lower middle income neighborhood, has seen
significant transformation. The mushrooming offices of property brokers and
builders attest to the increased desirability of investment in the local
residential market. Under such a situation of increasing demand, confirming
legal title to land offers a means to reaping greater economic profit from
property transactions. Further, in the case of irregular power of attorney
transactions, confirming tenure security through freehold conversion should
be a predominant concern for local residents.
As residents eligible for free conversion are entitled to the means to greater
economic profit or tenure security at no economic cost, then it is logical to
assume that the rate of conversion for this group should be significantly
higher than for others. In Lajpatnagar, the only properties eligible for free
conversion are 1,536 two-room tenements termed 'C'-Type Tenements.
Figures for 'C'-Type applications were manually tabulated from L&DO files
maintained by its Conversion Cell. As residents of leasehold property under
50 sq. yds. in area, are the only group of leasehold residents for whom
3 2 The new computer cell at the DDA uses a standard format that essentially duplicates the
hard copy application form filed by leasehold residents. Again, no attempt is made to
differentiate applications either by plot size category or by income category. This rather
unimaginative approach ignores the potential for analysis of data entry fields, and frustrates
any attempt at a meaningful analysis.
Table 1
Percentage of Total Conversions versus 'Free' Conversions
For DDA Administered Leaseholds:
(Source: DDA Records)
Appplications received between February 15, 1992 and July 31, 1993:
Total Applications Received: 15,803
Total Eligible Applicants: 200,000
Percentage of Applicants: 7.90 %
For L&DO Administered Leaseholds:
(Source: L&DO Records)
Appplications received between February 15, 1992 and August 6, 1993:
Total Applications Received: 3,140
Total Eligible Applicants: 60,000
Percentage of Applicants: 5.23 %
'Free' Conversions in L&DO Administered Leaseholds:
(Source: L&DO Records)
Applications received between February 15, 1992 and July 27, 1993:
Total Free Conversions ( 'C' Type Tenements) in Lajpatnagar: 124
Total Eligible Applicants ('C' Type Tenements) in Lajpatnagar: 1536
Percentage of Applicants: 8.07 %
property acquired through the irregular power of attorney transfer does not
invite an additional surcharge. The rate of conversion should logically be
much higher than the norm.
Free conversions for Lajpatnagar equal 8.07% (see Table 1). The percentage of
conversion across groups eligible for "free" conversion and those required to
pay a conversion charge then, shows little variance. There appears little
indication therefore, that the price fixed for the conversion charge has
significantly affected the percentage of conversion.
Further tabulation to determine the rates of conversion for all plots under 50
sq. yds., and by different plot sizes and income categories, is required, before a
generalizable conclusion can be made on the relationship between the
conversion charge and the rates of conversion. If the pattern observed in
Lajpatnagar holds for the entire residential leasehold sub-market, the
government's presumption that resolving the dispute over the conversion
charge will result in a significant increase in freehold conversions, cannot be
supported. While, as discussed earlier, high conversion charges do deter some
residents from converting to freehold tenure, they cannot be the only reason
why residents do not choose to do so. In the following chapter, I discuss the
three primary reasons why residents do not convert to freehold ownership.
Chapter 3
WHY RESIDENTS DO NOT CONVERT TO FREEHOLD TENURE
Administration officials tacitly accept that their determination of the
conversion charge dissuaded residents from converting to freehold
ownership, by claiming that residents will apply for conversion only after the
Delhi High Court delivers its decision on the dispute over the conversion
charge. I have shown that the high conversion charge cannot fully explain
the low response to the freehold conversion scheme. As indicated earlier,
there are three primary reasons why residents did not choose to convert to
freehold tenure. First, freehold conversion imposes not just the direct cost of
the conversion charge but also indirect costs that significantly increase the
cost of conversion. These costs are discussed directly below. Second, the
transfer of the right to permanent title to legal lessees and formal and legal
title for residents who have irregular title through the power of attorney,
appears largely superfluous. The issue of the relevance of permanent and
formal title is discussed in the second section. Third, the right to freely
transfer property was of little value to residents, because the power of attorney
transaction allowed secure transfers of property. In addition, the use of the
power of attorney for the transfer of leasehold property, gives both buyer and
seller greater economic benefit than regular sales transfers. These economic
benefits are described in the third section of this chapter. Contrary therefore to
the administration's contention that conversion has economic value to
residents, as it involves the transfer of rights additional to that given through
government law, it appears that residents already enjoy de facto rights that
make the legal transfer of these rights unnecessary.
High Indirect Costs of Conversion
Lessees find that conversion to freehold tenure involves additional costs over
and above the conversion charge. A Ministry of Urban Development
notification dated 2/25/92, requires certain conditions be met before an
application for freehold conversion will be considered. According to this
notification, lessees directly or indirectly incur three kinds of charges in
addition to the applicable conversion charge.
First, the conversion deed must be registered, which requires the payment of
a registration charge and a stamp duty. These additional charges are estimated
at approximately nine percent of the applicable conversion charge (The
Economic Times, 14/3/93).
According to a second clause, all arrears of ground rent along with interest
will have to be paid "prior to the grant of conversion permission" (Economic
Times, 3/14/93). Krishna Rao (1993), points out that recovery of past arrears is
mandatory before any permits are issued by the L&DO or the DDA. As with
the collection of ground rents, lease administration rarely actively enforces
lease restrictions. The administration usually waits for residents to come to
them for permits for construction, sales transfers, "mutation" or
intergenerational transfer, and mortgages, to collect all unpaid and past dues.
Residents therefore express some trepidation about seeking permits from
lease administration, as to do so only invites the attention of the
administration that under the normal course is not directed towards such
non-compliance to lease restrictions. However, the costs imposed are not
always very high, such as when only past arrears of ground rent have to be
paid. In many cases, as pointed out in Chapter 2, ground rent is very low, and
paying past arrears does not impose a significant cost. One resident of a high
income category DDA flat could not remember what the ground rent
assessment for his apartment was. He explained that neither he, nor anyone
that he knew in his neighborhood, had paid the bi-annual ground rent in
recent years, and he had forgotten how much it was.33 As far as he could
remember, he added, it was "quite low".
A third clause notes that applicants are required to file an affidavit that there
is no "unauthorized construction". This clause refers to restrictions imposed
by the lease contract on extensions to leasehold property. Residents had to
apply for a formal permit from both the lease administering body, and
because of the jurisdictional overlap, the local municipal corporation. One
leasehold resident from South Delhi told me that he had considered filing for
conversion, but because of this clause, had decided not to. He noted that he
had invited professional opinion from an architect before making an
extension to his house. He had been assured that the extension did not qualify
as a deviation under the municipal by-laws. This resident felt however, that
he would be harassed by the lease administration because he had not applied
for a formal clearance for the extension. He feared that administration
employees would delay his application, and demand bribes to clear his
application for processing. The fear of attracting the attention of rent-seeking
lease adminstration employees is frequently mentioned by various sources as
a possible deterrent to potential tenure conversion applicants.34 From my
interviews, it is not clear that this was very often a deciding factor. In the case
of unauthorized construction, residents can be legally cleared from further
liability with the payment of a fine. If that fine is for some reason prohibitive
to the resident, he can probably find a rent-seeking agent to ensure immunity
from such penalty for a lower economic cost. 35 However, because of the
3 3 Agrawal (1994), notes that when faced with the issue of compliance to law, residents "look
to the right and to the left". If they find other cases of non-compliance, they choose to ignore
the law for what Tyler (1990) terms "instrumental" reasons. According to Tyler, the
instrumental approach explains conformance to law as a result of an analysis of "personal gains
and losses resulting from different kinds of behavior" (Tyler, 1990: 3). Where there is no fear of
deterrence as a result of the poor enforcement of law, there is a negligible cost involved.
34 Gambhir (1993), suggests that the image of the DDA as a corrupt organization is so pervasive
that people are afraid to come to the DDA even when it is in their interest to do so, for fear of
harrassment.
3 5 For instance, such immunity can be obtained by a page "disappearing" from the file listing
the offence, with no one the wiser. Bribes for such "services" in India, and more so in Delhi,
Table 2
Relative Conversion Charges for Lessees versus Power of Attorney Holders
UG
Charges for Lesses
Surcharge for PoA
Total for PoA
MIG/SFS I Type II
Charges for Lessees
Surcharge for PoA
Total for PoA
HIG/SFS II Type II (A & B)
Charges for Lessees
Surcharge for PoA
Total for PoA
SFS III
Charges for Lessees
Surcharge for PoA
Total for PoA
EAST
3000
999
3999
14,250
1,415.25
5,665.25
6,250
2,081
8331
75,000
2,497.50
9,997.50
NORTH/
WEST
9000
2997
11,997
12,750
4,245.75
15,510.75
18,750
6,243.75
24,993.75
22,500
7,492.50
29,992.50
SOUTH
12,000
3996
15,996
17,000
5661
22,661
25,000
8,325
33,325
30,000
9,990
39,990
CENTRAL
15,000
4995
19,995
21,250
7076
28,326
31,250
10,406.25
41,656.25
37,500
12,487.50
49,987.50
Source: The Economic Times, New Delhi, March 14, 1993
involve a simple and direct logic, and little ambiguity. They are variable according to the
bribe-seeker's assessment of the bribe-maker's ability and willingness to pay. In that sense
they are "progressive" and particularized, as they are directly related to a particular
individual's ability to pay. Some amount of negotiation is usually involved in the
"transaction". The "going rate" for a particular "service" is shared and information freely
spreads outside the organizational system that a bribe-maker wishes to have access to.
overlap of control with the municipal corporation, residents are not cleared
of liability to the municipal corporation.
Properties transferred on the basis of a power of attorney, invite charges in
addition to the three mentioned above (Table 2). According to the notification
of 25 February, 1992, in addition to the applicable conversion charge, a
surcharge of 33.3 percent of the conversion fee is levied in such cases
(Economic Times, 3/14/93).36 Such properties become eligible for freehold
conversion only if the applicant is able to establish proof of possession of the
property. According to Indian law, "proof of possession" is established by
registration with the Sub-Registrar of Deeds. As power of attorney
transactions are considered irregular by urban administration, the lease
administering authority does not recognize that leasehold rights have been
legally transferred from seller to buyer in such a transaction. Formal
leasehold title, and hence "proof of possession", remains in the name of the
original lessee. For the registration of the property with the Sub-Registrar of
Deeds, a resident who has transferred leasehold rights through the power of
attorney now needs to pay registration charges and stamp duties avoided at
the time of the irregular sales transfer. At approximately nine percent, these
charges are assessed on the sales price. In addition, conversion requires
further registration costs at nine percent of the conversion charge, before the
lease administration will issue the "conveyance deed". Registration costs for
properties transferred on the power of attorney then, are significantly higher
than for legal lessees.
Sharma of the Apex Association claims that the government's decision to
regularize power of attorney transfers through the payment of the additional
surcharge is an appropriately progressive strategy given the prevailing
housing shortage. He likens the move to the way "in which unauthorized
clusters are given legal ownership by the government in a welfare state"
(Hindustan Times, 3/15/91). He notes:
3 6 Residents of plots smaller than 50 sq. yds., as noted earlier, are exempt from the surcharge.
The decision by the government that those who have
bought [leasehold] property on power of attorney have to
pay 33.3 percent above the normal conversion fee for
making their leasehold property freehold has for the first
time given 'legitimacy' to those people owning [leasehold]
property through power of attorney." (G.S. Sharma,
Secretary General, Apex Association of DDA Colonies,
quoted in the Hindustan Times, 3/15/91).
The option to regularize power of attorney transfers has however been
available to residents since October 1989. A scheme was introduced at that
time to allow the regularization of power of attorney transactions. Under this
scheme, buyers who had acquired property through the power of attorney
were permitted to regularize these transfers. To do so, buyers were required to
pay the 50% unearned increase assessed according to a fixed zonal scale, plus a
2.5 percent levy assessed on the ground rent. An article in the Hindustan
Times (10/13/89) refers to this scheme:
The first advertisement, three months ago, said that all
such transactions effected before 31.3.1989 should be
regularized before the end of June. Thereafter, another
advertisement stated that on account of large public
demand the date had been extended to the end of
September. It is said that the large demand was the receipt
of merely 114 applications for regularization. It would be
interesting to know how many applications have by now
been received by DDA as against the tens of thousands of
[power of attorney] transactions that have taken place.
(H.D. Shourie in the Hindustan Times, 10/13/89).
This first scheme met with a poor response, as is evident from an article in
The Indian Express. The Express notes: "The rates in that scheme were high ...
And there were no takers among the property owners" (Indian Express,
4/11/91). The second scheme of March 1991 (refer Table 3), reduced the rates
for the regularization of the power of attorney. The Indian Express reports:
The government's scheme for converting leasehold
[property] to freehold, ... allows a double benefit for ...
[residents] ... who have purchased property on power of
attorney. Not only have the rates for converting
Table 3
Charges for Regularization of Power of Attorney Transactions
UNEARNED INCREASE/CONVERSION CHARGES PAYABLE BY G.P.A. HOLDERS OF DDA FLATS
FOR REGULARISATION OF THEIR TRANSACTIONS.
EAST ZONE WEST ZONE NORTH ZONE SOUTH ZONE
As per scheme As per now As per scheme As per new As per scheme As par new As per scheme As per new
nnounced in scheme en- announced in schem en- announced in scheme an- ennounced In scheme Sn.Feb. 1990 nounced in Feb. 90 nounood In Feb. 1990 nounced In Feb. 90 nouned inMarch. 91 March. 91 March. 31 . March. 91
(Re.) (Re.) (Re.) (Rs.) (Re.) (Re.) (Re.) (Re.)
JANATA 3.800/- NIL 14.450/- NIL 15.050/- NIL . 18.950/- NILLI.G. 8.000/- 4.000/- 30.500/- 12.000/- 31.750/- 12.009/- 40.000/- 16.000/-M.I.G. 16.050/- 5.666/- 61.050/- 17.000/- 63,550/- 17.000/- 80.050/- 22.666/-SFS(II) 17,100/- 8.666/- 65.050/- 25.000/- 67,700/- 25,000/- 85.300/- 33.333/-SFS(III) 21.750/- 10.000/- 82.700/- 30.000/- 86.1004- 30.000/- 1.08.450/- 40.000/-
Source:The Indian Express, New Delhi, April 11, 1991
properties from leasehold to freehold been reduced
[relative to the earlier Rajiv Gandhi Government's
scheme of 1989], but the cost of regularizing the general
power of attorney (GPA) has also been slashed. In [the 1989
scheme], there was no provision for conversion to
freehold. ... [The conversion fee].. includes a 33.3%
surcharge if property has been transferred on power of
attorney. (Indian Express, 4/11/91).
For these residents with irregular title to property however, the cost of
regularizing their right to that property comes at a significantly lower cost
than under previous regulation. Further, by allowing for the first time the
additional incentive of freehold conversion, the residents simultaneously
benefited from the additional rights granted by freehold ownership. Why
then did residents possessing irregular title to property not choose to convert,
with the costs of regularization reduced and the benefits greater?
Tenure Security Through Freehold Ownership of Little Significance
Though lessees appear to see little benefit in the government's freehold
conversion scheme, it is suggested by some analysts that freehold conversion
is beneficial to leasehold residents who have acquired property through the
irregular power of attorney transaction. Freehold conversion offers them
"legal and regular" title to their property. Others claim that residents find no
need for formal title to property other than that provided by the power of
attorney.
A builder who operates largely in Lajpatnagar, believes that formal title is
unimportant to local residents. He notes that most buyers of property in
Lajpatnagar come from the area, or are related to local residents (80-90% by his
estimate). As a result, he says, there is a degree of trust operating in the
market, which makes it unnecessary for buyers to seek a greater degree of
security than offered by the power of attorney. He attributes the closed
structure of the local residential market to causing the lack of interest in
conversion. 37
K.T. Ravindran, Head of the Urban Design Program at the School of
Planning, Delhi, confirms that Lajpatnagar's residential market reflects a
closed ethnic structure. Studies by his urban design students have
documented the social landscape of Lajpatnagar's housing market (Kumar
and Srinivas, 1988, et al). Ravindran points out that both residents and
property brokers come from the same ethnic background and act concertedly
to prevent the entry of other religious and ethnic groups into the area. The
closed nature of the residential market in relation to ethnicity, then, has so far
been largely self-perpetuating. At the same time, however, a clear social
interrelationship between residents of varying income levels is apparent.
Local parks are populated in the evenings by male elders of the community
disregarding social class to reminisce on their common heritage. Other
resettlement colonies in New Delhi also display this high level of social
cohesion for the same reasons.
How long this social cohesion will last is unclear. Ravindran points out that
surviving patriarchs in these resettlement colonies, and especially in
Lajpatnagar, have held their growing families together. With the growth of
their families, there has been increased pressure from their children to
separate from the social unit of the extended family. Where these patriarchs
are the original lessees of lower income group housing, they live in the small
two-room tenements allotted to them by the government. New housing has
become increasingly unaffordable as housing cost has risen rapidly in the now
relatively centrally located resettlement colonies like Lajpatnagar. Tenements
in these areas, therefore, have become increasingly overcrowded as the
expanding families are forced to share space.
To find whether confirming formal and permanent title had been an issue for
residents of such lower income housing, I spoke to a few who had applied for
3 7 Razzaz (1991), points to the importance of kinship and place-of-origin relationships in
dispute prevention and containment.
freehold conversion. In one interviewed household, fourteen members
shared a two-room tenement. The lessee, Kapoor, lived with his wife, three
sons and their families, in the tenement allotted to them by the Ministry of
Rehabilitation and Resettlement in 1952. Kapoor had applied for freehold
conversion and had recently been notified that his conveyance deed was
ready to be signed.38 As the lessee of a 32 sq. yd. tenement, he was eligible to
apply for freehold conversion without paying a conversion charge. When
asked whether he was prompted to seek tenure conversion to consolidate his
hold on the property, Kapoor and his eldest son replied in the negative.
Kapoor, like other interviewed lessees, did not appear insecure about
permanence of tenure under the 99-year lease.
If insecurity of tenure was not a reason, why did Kapoor choose to convert to
freehold tenure? Kapoor said he did so because it was a "good thing", and his
property was no longer subject to the "dual control" of the lease
administration and the municipal corporation. The decision to convert, he
noted, had been made in consultation with his three sons. From the
interview it appeared that his eldest son had taken the initiative in filing for
freehold conversion.
Did Kapoor apply for conversion because it would be easier for him to sell his
property? When asked whether he planned to sell the property, his eldest son
replied, "Who knows? If we get a good price, we may sell." Kapoor did not
need to convert to freehold tenure to make such a sale. He had been a lessee
for thirty years and was no longer restricted by the ten year lease prohibition
on sale. He was free therefore, to transfer leasehold rights at any time.
Did conversion to freehold tenure make it easier for him to transfer property?
Kapoor said that if he wished to sell his property, a legal sales transfer
required L&DO's clearance for sale. This permit took a long time to process,
sometimes even up to a year. He said this delay inhibited lessees' freedom to
3 8 The "conveyance deed" is an official declaration from the lease administering authority
establishing the conversion of property from leasehold to freehold tenure. In effect this
involves freeing the property from the regulatory jurisdiction of the lease administering
authority.
make a sale. An interview with another local resident reveals however, that
leasehold property transactions take this procedural delay into account. The
transfer of property is usually made at the convenience of the buyer and the
seller, and at a mutually acceptable sales price. The buyer then files for sales
permission to the L&DO on behalf of the seller. A small percentage of the
agreed upon sales figure is held back by the buyer, until he has received legal
permission from the L&DO. This informal convention appears to have
general acceptance in the leasehold property market. Interestingly, Kapoor did
not mention that in the event of a sales transfer, payment of the 50%
unearned increase would be necessary at the time of sale, as long as the
property remained under leasehold tenure. Converting the property to
freehold in effect freed Kapoor as the seller, from the need to split proceeds
from sale with the lease administration.39
Making a sales transfer however, did not appear an immediate priority with
Kapoor and his family. They had recently acquired a second property
adjoining their first property through a power of attorney transfer. Kapoor
expected to extend this property in the future to accommodate the families of
one or more of his sons. This property also had been recently cleared for
freehold conversion by the L&DO.
Did Kapoor apply for tenure conversion to make it easier to use his property
as security for a loan? Formal financial institutions prefer to mortgage
freehold property rather than leasehold property, especially when lease
periods begin to run out. Kapoor's second property was acquired through the
power of attorney. Banks are reluctant to mortgage such property, unless the
request is filed by the original lessee. Conversion to freehold ownership could
have made it easier for Kapoor's family to obtain a loan to finance future
construction. When asked whether they had converted to freehold tenure to
be able to finance any future construction through a mortgage, the eldest son
said that had not been a reason. They expected to finance the construction
through their own personal savings. The family had expended a large part of
39 It must be remembered here that conversion to freehold ownership is not the only way to
avoid the payment of unearned increase. Transferring property through the power of attorney
allows the same purpose even under leasehold tenure.
its personal resources in acquiring the second property a year ago, and would
invest in construction on this property, when they had generated enough in
personal savings to do so.
Kapoor's family revealed neither a powerful motive, such as the desire to
confirm tenure security, nor an immediate reason, for converting their
properties to freehold tenure. They did so for mundane reasons. One, to
avoid seeking permits from both the lease administration and the municipal
corporation in the event of future construction. Two, to have the option to
make a legal sale at some possible future time, without needing to seek a
permit or share profits with the government. However, other unspoken
reasons may also have motivated them. The idea to convert the Kapoor
family's properties to freehold tenure appeared to come from his eldest son. If
this was indeed the case, this son may have used the occasion to confirm his
claim to the property over that of his two brothers.40 It is also possible that
Kapoor and his eldest son may have used the occasion provided by the
transition of tenure to explore how living space could be fairly distributed
among the family, and to clarify claims so that there would be little room for
later dispute.
As noted earlier, the increased unaffordability of housing has forced the
children of original lessees to stay in their parents' overcrowded tenements.
These families stay together while the household heads retain legal claim to
property as lessees. As these lessees succumb to age, conflicting claims on
property erupt with the removal of their controlling influence. Ravindran
points out that the municipal courts are now flooded by property claims
where siblings contest their right to these properties. As a result, individuals
seeking the resolution of such conflicting claims, appear increasingly
dependent on the formal legal system to resolve such conflicts. The
dependence on trust, as noted by the builder introduced earlier, contributes
only partly to the lack of interest in additional legal security offered by formal
4 0 Intergenerational transfer of leasehold property is termed "mutation" by lease
administration. Mutation of leasehold property requires that a claimant to the transfer of
leasehold rights produce proof that his or her siblings waive their claim to the property. Such
a waiver is not required with freehold property.
title to ownership. It appears that these competing property claims can only
increase over time, as social ties loosen with change in social relationships.41
It was suggested that strong kinship and family ties in the older resettlement
colonies create a sense of trust, enabling the resolution of property conflicts
without the need for formal law. However, the gradual breakdown of the
social order is indicated by competing property claims in court. Clearly
residents have not depended only on "trust" to resolve property conflicts
even in these ethnically homogenous neighborhoods. It appears that when
intergenerational transfer of property occurs, legally defensible right to
property acquires importance, especially when individuals are exposed to
competing claims. Why then, was formal and regular title not important for
residents who had transferred property through the irregular power of
attorney?42
Economic Benefit and Formal Legitimacy Through the Power of Attorney
In this section I first show that the power of attorney transfer gives both buyer
and seller greater economic benefit than regular and legal property transfers.
As shown earlier, the option to regularize these irregular transfers has been
available to residents for four years now. However, few cases of regularization
have been reported. Power of attorney transactions are motivated by the
desire to maximize profits from sales transfers, and it appears that few buyers
are prepared to pay the costs of regularization. I then show why residents who
have irregular title to property through the power of attorney have no need
for formal title. Though it appears that buyers who acquire property through
the power of attorney only have de facto right to property, they are in fact able
to defend their claim to property in a court of law.
4 1 Black (1976: 6) supports such a reading: "the quantity of law increases as the quantity of
social control of ... [social groups] decreases, and vice versa".
4 2 The Times of India (3/13/91) notes, "By its latest decision ... [allowing conversion into
freehold] ... , the government has only given de jure status to a de facto situation.
Residents, real estate brokers and lawyers appear to have collaborated to
evolve a sophisticated method to get around lease restrictions on property
transfers. 43 That collaboration has resulted in the evolution of the power of
attorney transfer. The power of attorney transfer involves three parties in the
transaction, and two separate legal documents. The first document is the
General Power of Attorney itself. The second is a Sales Agreement. The use of
these documents in conjunction enables property transfers without inviting
the accompanying transaction costs. 44
The General Power of Attorney is a legal instrument that designates a
representative selected by an owner of any form of property to act on his or
her behalf. It is however not intended for a property sale, and therefore legally
cannot mention a transaction amount. This document does not require
registration with the Sub-Registrar of Deeds. As a result, the power of attorney
invites no registration charges. At between eight and nine per cent of the
reported sales price, registration charges can be a significant cost to the buyer.
A regular transfer of leasehold rights also invites additional cost to the seller.
50% of the unearned increase, assessed relative to the allotment price, is
required from the seller for reported sales transfers. In addition, the seller is
required to pay a capital gains tax of 30% assessed on the reported sales price.
In the power of attorney transfer of property, the following process takes
place. The General Power of Attorney is signed by the seller and a third party,
who receives no financial gain in the transaction. This third party is usually a
spouse, or other close relative of the seller. The General Power of Attorney,
can be registered with the Sub-Registrar of Deeds. However, the document
does not mention a transaction amount. Therefore only a minimal stamp
43An article in the Hindustan Times (10/13/89) in describing the problems of the leasehold
system notes, "One serious manifestation ... has been the emergence of the system of power of
attorney. This system has been so well perfected by real estate agents that it has become fool-
proof from the viewpoint of law".
44Moore (1978) explains that when people are faced by the prospect of gain, they act to exploit
"open areas" to achieve that gain. Moore notes, "[P]eople arrange their immediate situations ...
by exploiting the indeterminacies in the situation ... or by reinterpreting or redefining the rules
or relationships. They use whatever areas there are of inconsistency, contradiction, conflict,
ambiguity, or open areas ... to achieve immediate situational ends." (Moore, 1978: 50).
duty of Rs. 11 is required for registration (Agrawal, 1993). The Sales
Agreement is signed between the third party who holds the General Power of
Attorney, and the buyer of the property. The Sales Agreement does not
require registration according to Indian law, and states the transaction
amount. The transaction amount stated in the Sales Agreement is usually
grossly under-reported. 45
The percentage of "black" money involved in power of attorney transactions
tends to be quite high. In one power of attorney transaction for a leasehold
flat, the buyer paid to the seller 39.1% of the agreed upon sales price in the
form of cash. This amount was unrecorded in the transaction. The seller, a
speculative investor, did not even live in Delhi. The DDA flat was sold
immediately after allotment to the seller, at 250% of its allotment price.
Percentages are based on sales transaction figures quoted by a power of
attorney holder I interviewed. The allotment price to the seller for the 1200 sq.
ft. DDA flat was Rs. 225, 000. The buyer paid a total of Rs. 600,000 for the flat in
1988, of which Rs. 575,000 was paid to the seller. Of the amount paid to the
seller, Rs. 350,000 was recorded as the official sales price, with an additional
225,000 paid in "black". Brokerage costs, and lawyer's fees for the preparation
of the GPA, accounted for the remaining Rs. 25,000.
The buyer had gone to different brokers before selecting to buy the particular
flat. He had expressed no special preference for the particular leasehold flat.
Most DDA flats tend to be standardized and the rates paid by buyers tend to
conform to the rates and procedures of a well-established parallel market.
Property brokers supply free information to housing allottees in an attempt to
induce them to sell. Brokers have access to allotment lists from sources in the
DDA. Letters from brokers are received by allottees even before they received
official letters of allotment from the DDA. Allottees are informed of the
prevailing "going-rate" that representative properties fetch on the parallel
market, and the premiums on the allotment price that can be earned
4 5 In referring to transactions of leasehold properties, an article in the Hindustan Times
(10/13/89) notes, "Almost invariably the prices are under-valued in the deals. Some glaring
cases of under-valuation of properties of large values have attracted action by income-tax
authorities, leading to subsequent actions. But in numerous cases, the under-valuation prevails".
(Benjamin, 1993). This particular transaction then, can be understood to be
representative of the leasehold market in general, in terms of the proportion
of declared and undeclared incomes and fees involved in such transactions.
A newspaper article notes in March 1993 that "nearly 90 percent of leasehold
properties change hands by adopting the Power of Attorney route" (Economic
Times, 3/14/93). It is necessary to examine the power of attorney transaction
to understand why these transfers continue to be so widely used. Given that
the power of attorney does not give the buyer formal title to property, it is not
clear why this mechanism is used in preference to other possible irregular
methods of transfer.
The power of attorney over time, has evolved into a lengthy and elaborate
document, to protect the buyer from any attempt by the seller to reclaim
transferred property. A number of different clauses referring to the nature of
transfer were included in the document to make it for all practical purposes
irrevocable. Property was transferred to multiple members of a family,
"gifted" and "willed" to the buyer, and so on. If the power of attorney was
contested in court by the seller, or lease administration, the resulting lengthy
and drawn out legal process would ensure that no final legal decision would
be seen in the contesting parties' lifetimes. The multiple clauses then,
ensured the legal defensibility of the power of attorney in court. Buyers
therefore did not fear that sellers would attempt to reestablish legal claim to
property transferred on the power of attorney.
How does the power of attorney give the buyer legally defensible right? A
buyer is likely to face two kinds of threat. One, from the lease administration.
Two, from the seller, if he or she is an original lessee, and by government law
retains legal title to property. A distinction must be made here between the
law of government that I refer to as government law, and the law of the
courts, which I refer to as juridical law, to understand how the buyer enjoys
legally defensible right to property.
While both the General Power of Attorney and the Sales Agreement are legal
documents according to government law, the power of attorney, which
comprises of these two documents and effects the transfer of property is illegal
by government law. However, according to juridical law, the power of
attorney is fully legal, for its two component documents are fully legal
documents. For juridical law to consider the power of attorney illegal, lease
administration needs to contest the legality of the power of attorney. For this
contestation to take place, the administration needs to establish to juridical
law that the General Power of Attorney has been used in combination with
the Sales Agreement in a sales transfer of lease property, and as a result breaks
government law. Detection and proof of such a transaction is difficult for
lease administration even if was motivates to do so. Such contestation has in
fact never taken place (Agrawal, 1994). As there has so far been no precedent
of a challenge to its legality, this mechanism continues to be acceptable to
juridical law.
In the case of competing claims between residents, only the original lessee can
demonstrate greater claim to title than the power of attorney holder. Though
the original lessee continues to have legal title, he or she cannot force the
eviction of the lessee for such a decision has to be made by juridical law.
According to Indian juridical law, physical possession is considered "three-
fourth title". Residents who have acquired property through the power of
attorney also make sure that the original documents to title are handed over
with the property sale. Original lessees do not contest the power of attorney,
because in the first place it involves a breach of trust. Second the original
lessee no longer has the documents to title in his or her possession once the
sale has taken place. Third, any such contestation as pointed out earlier, is
unlikely to be decided within his or her lifetime. Fourth, as the buyer keeps
dated records of physical possession such as electricity bills, telephone
connection, registered letters addressed to the buyer at the address, he or she is
easily able to establish physical possession. A decision even if taken, is under
such circumstances very unlikely to be decided in the original lessees favor by
Indian juridical law. Fifth, in the case of such a property dispute, the lease
administration, as the lessor, is automatically notified by the court about the
circumstances of the dispute. The original lessee has no wish to invite the
attention of the lease administration, for he or she is directly implicated in
the irregular power of attorney transaction with not having paid lease
administration the unearned increase at the time of the property sale
(Agrawal, 1994).
As noted earlier, official title does not pass to the buyer in a power of attorney
transaction. The property transaction therefore, is not recognized as a legal
transfer of leasehold rights. De jure title to ownership therefore remains with
the original lessee, though de facto right rests with the buyer through the
power of attorney. For leasehold residents, de facto right to ownership
established by the power of attorney is equivalent to the de jure right to title
offered by the freehold conversion option. Residents therefore find no
additional tenure security by regularizing the power of attorney transfer.
However, the lack of de jure title imposed by the use of the power of attorney
in fact offers significant economic advantage to both buyers and sellers.
CONCLUSION
Residents who chose not to convert to freehold ownership, appear motivated
by three primary reasons. One, total direct and indirect costs of conversion are
considered excessive. Residents expressed initial interest in the freehold
conversion scheme because they anticipated that freehold conversion would
be granted to them for a nominal charge. However, when confronted with
the total direct and indirect costs of conversion, they chose not to convert to
freehold tenure. The government's attempt to enforce compulsory
conversion was immediately contested, for the majority of lessees do not see
immediate benefit in the freehold conversion scheme. Though few residents
have chosen to convert to freehold tenure, they still sought an indefinite
extension of the deadline for conversion. Residents do not want to restrict
their future option to convert to freehold ownership at a later date, even
though they find freehold conversion at the present time not justified by the
immediate advantages it brings.
Two, lessees are not insecure about tenure, and find no need for the
additional tenure rights offered by freehold ownership. Lessees already enjoy
de facto rights that the government attempts to transfer to them through
freehold ownership. These de facto rights are largely the result of the
administration's poor enforcement of lease restrictions. 4 6 The
administration's poor record of enforcement are the result of the strong bias
of Indian juridical law in favor of residents, and strong political compulsions.
Leasehold residents have tended to infringe government law by non-
4 6 While the lease contract assigns lease administration the authority to 'determine' a lease if
lease conditions are not met, that provision is rarely exercised (Krishna Rao, 1993).
compliance to lease conditions. The lease administration has largely relied on
occasions when residents seek permits, to try to recover past unpaid dues, and
to levy penalties for non-compliance to the lease contract. Some residents
therefore, express reluctance to invite the attention of the government to
such past transgressions by applying for freehold conversion. However, the
power of the administration to enforce even the payment of past dues is
limited. If residents do not pay lease dues, the administration can take
deviants to court under the Public Money Recovery Act, but residents can
easily obtain an injunction or "stay" to avoid the necessity of paying such
dues. The lease administration therefore rarely follows up on the recovery of
dues by taking transgressors to court (Agrawal, 1994). As a result, the urban
administration has only one effective deterrent, the ability to deny applicants
permission for the clearance they have applied for. Residents, who therefore
do not expect to be given such clearance for non-payment of past dues, and
are unwilling to pay the appropriate compensation to the administration, just
do not apply for such permits. This may explain why some residents do not
come forward to apply for freehold conversion.
Three and most important, the power of attorney gives residents a
mechanism sanctified by juridical law, allowing them to maximize
immediate economic profit by irregular transactions, with no fear of punitive
action from the government. Defensible right to property becomes most
important at times of economic and intergenerational transfer of property. In
the past, most applications for permits to the urban administration, have
been for the mutation of property (Agrawal, 1994). Though the power of
attorney transfer does not give buyers legal title, the two components of the
power of attorney are fully legal and recognized by both government and
juridical law. Buyers appear not to fear action by the government. They are
able however, to defend their right to property in a court of law from other
claimants. Buyers therefore are guaranteed de facto title to property, that is
equivalent to freehold ownership, for they fear no threat of eviction from the
government. This lack of fear is encouraged by the bias of Indian juridical law
in favor of residents, and the legal precedent set by the lack of challenge to the
power of attorney.
The government introduced the leasehold system in New Delhi largely to
achieve control over speculative interests. A primary reason for the
ineffectiveness of the leasehold system in New Delhi is the result of
widespread irregular transactions through the power of attorney. The
perceived failures of the leasehold system to control speculative investment
therefore, can be attributed to the gap in law that does not require that the
power of attorney transfer be registered. Given that few residents have chosen
to convert to freehold tenure, it appears that the government must continue
to maintain a large part of its leasehold system. If the government wishes to
better administer its leasehold system, some rationalization is required in the
framing of lease restrictions.
First, the determination of unearned increase and ground rent must be based
on a more rational system.47 Second, the blanket restriction on the resale of
leasehold property allotments for ten years appears to be a misplaced form of
intervention. Most speculative resales of leasehold property occur before the
property is actually occupied by the allottee, and restrictions on resale for
more than a period of one year appear pointless to attempt to enforce. Third,
lease restrictions on land use create "dual control", and an unnecessary
jurisdictional overlap with the regulatory authority of the municipal
corporations. Fourth, and most immediately, the legal loophole provided by
the power of attorney transaction then, must be closed to force the
regularization of property transactions. As the most important of the four
components of regulatory reform, I focus largely on the process required to
ensure the registration of the power of attorney transaction.
The continued use of the power of attorney has serious negative implications
for the goals of the State. Most mundanely, and probably most importantly,
4 7 A possible reason some residents used the power of attorney is because administration used
arbitrary methods in determining land rates in the eighties. Lacking accurate information on
market rates of land, urban administration decided that land rates increased at 20% per annum
during the late eighties (Agrawal, 1994). Unearned increase, which was determined on the
basis of the government's determination of land rates, were increased every year, bearing little
relation to actual market rates. Agrawal believes that government determined land rates were
much higher than prevailing market rates and as a result had an inflationary effect on
prevailing land rates.
power of attorney sales do not require registration, so the government has no
means of tracking the working of the land market. The lack of any reliable
information means that policy intervention on land or housing may be
misdirected. Further, property transactions have historically been a
convenient source of speculative investment. This has occurred for two
reasons: one irregular transactions enable the use of undeclared or "black"
income in property transactions. Two, Land is a non-producible commodity,
and there are gains to be made by withholding it from the market.
Speculative withholding of land from the market may create supply
shortfalls, which result in increasing housing costs. While such speculative
investment may ensure greater economic benefit to a select few, it makes
housing more inaccessible to the majority under circumstances of acute
housing shortages.
As discussed earlier, the use of the power of attorney offers significant
economic advantage to both buyers and sellers over regular sales transactions.
The buyer finds that by using the power of attorney, the payment of stamp
duties and registration charges levied on sales transactions can be avoided. In
addition, the use of the power of attorney facilitates the use of undeclared
income or "black" money in these irregular transactions. Since the Sales
Agreement is not related to a regular property transaction, urban
administration is unable to check whether these power of attorney
transactions are under-reported. The buyer is then able to use undeclared
income in such a transaction without risk of detection by the income tax
department. 48 The seller finds that by using the power of attorney, the
payment of unearned increase can be avoided. In addition, sellers also benefit
from a reduced capital gains tax on the under-reported sales price.49 As long
48An article in the The Times of India (3/14/91) interviews property dealers on their
perception of how leasehold residents would respond to the newly introduced tenure conversion
scheme. In reference to the inclusion allowing conversion of property transferred on the power of
attorney, the article quotes a property dealer as saying, "People would do so [apply for
conversion] only if submission of income-tax certificates was not required". The press article goes
on to say, "Terming it a major flaw, [he] said no person would come forward otherwise."
4 9The capital gains tax is levied on total income reported, therefore tax on income earned
through such transactions is levied through a progressive income tax slab. Agrawal (1993),
as the power of attorney transaction does not require the registration of
transactions, and remains a legal option, property owners have little
incentive to regularize sales transactions.
Certain modifications in existing legislation will need to be introduced to
ensure that the power of attorney is not used for irregular sales transactions.
Property transfers in India are regulated by the Transfer of Property Act. The
act regulates property transfers, including ways of transferring immovable
property, such as the sale and gifting of property. Transfers mentioned in this
act are deemed legal, and require registration with the Sub-Registrar of Deeds.
Transfer through the power of attorney, however, is absent from the list of
transfers mentioned in the Transfer of Property Act. It is because of this
exclusion that the power of attorney invites no registration charges.
To prevent irregular transfers through the General Power of Attorney, a
modification to the Transfer of Property Act is required. It is necessary for a
clause to be inserted in the Transfer of Property Act listing the power of
attorney transfer among the registrable forms of sales transfer. This
automatically ensures that such transactions require registration with the
Sub-Registrar of Deeds. It will be necessary to ensure that a distinction is made
between the General Power of Attorney and the power of attorney
transaction, to ensure that the General Power of Attorney does not invite
registration costs for its originally intended use to effect transfer of authority.
A proposal suggesting the compulsory registration of the power of attorney
transfer is presently under consideration by the government. A report in the
Times of India (12/5/92) refers to a statement by the Minister of State for
urban development confirming that such a proposal is being reviewed. Such
a proposal may not be easy to legislate. Banerji (1993), notes that there is
considerable opposition to the proposal even within urban administration.
Those opposing the move claim that requiring the compulsory registration of
the power of attorney would be like "throwing the baby out with the
bathwater" (Banerji, 1993). They claim that the legitimate use of the General
Power of Attorney would be severely compromised, where it is to be used for
notes that a representative leasehold property transaction pushes the seller into a 45% income
tax bracket.
its originally intended purpose to effect a transfer of authority. They point out
that such a move would generate considerable opposition from residents and
would find little sympathy from the judges of the high court, who may "stay"
such legislation if, as is only to be expected, residents choose to contest such
regulation through due legal process. 50
The following steps must be taken to close the loophole provided by the
power of attorney. Two possible routes are open. One, regulation that requires
that power of attorney be granted for only a fixed period of a year, that is
subsequently renewable. This is expected to ensure that sales transfers of
leasehold property on the power of attorney will not take place, as renewal
will only be granted when an official responsible for such renewal is
convinced that the General Power of Attorney is used legitimately. 51
However, such a decision creates discretionary power by making it necessary
for subjective decisions to be taken about when the power of attorney is used
legitimately and when not, that only adds on another "level of governance",
at a time where administration appears eager to de-bureaucratize itself. Critics
of such a move within the administration claim that the creation of this
additional administrative level is a retrograde step that is inappropriate to the
government's present goal of divesting control, and minimizing regulatory
intervention in the housing market (Agrawal, 1994).
Two, a modification needs to be made to the Transfer of Property Act, as
outlined earlier, listing the power of attorney transaction as a legally
5 0 A "stay" or injunction, is a temporary freeze on the implementation of government law that is
under dispute for normative reasons. A court of law hearing such a case may in some cases where
there appears to be sufficient justification, grant a stay until it takes a decision on the
appropriateness of such law. The granting of a stay is in itself a minor moral victory for the
party requesting the stay. Pankaj Agrawal Director (Lands) notes that residents had requested
the high court for a stay on the tenure conversion scheme, but considers it a partial vindication
of the government's position that it was not granted.
51"Legitimate" uses of the General Power of Attorney include transfer of authority in cases
where property is under legal dispute, and the owner of property is unable for reasons of illness
or temporary absence to personally apear in court. Users of the General Power of Attorney
include owners of property temporarily resident abroad (non-resident Indians) who designate
local individuals to represent their interests. Other permitted usage of the General Power
ofAttorney includes use by women who own property, who for social or religious reasons (such as
the "purdah", for Muslim women), do not appear in court.
recognized method of transfer. As I have pointed out, such an inclusion
automatically makes the registration of such sales transfers mandatory. It is of
course imperative that the Transfer of Property Act clearly indicate that the
power of attorney is a "package", that comprises the General Power of
Attorney in combination with the Sales Agreement. The registration of the
General Power of Attorney if used by itself, will then not be required.
Modifying the Transfer of Property Act to include the power of attorney
transfer clearly involves better directed legislation and is the more logical
route to take.
The introduction of either of these regulations requires a modification to an
act that has been passed by Parliament. Such a modification is referred to as a
"simple amendment" to law. The procedure for a simple amendment of law
is mandated by the Indian Constitution. Four ministries are required to agree
to the appropriateness of such an amendment. In this case, where the move
would be initiated by the Ministry of Urban Development (MUD), three
additional and related ministries would be required to support the request for
the amendment. These ministries are that of Finance, Home and Law. MUD
is required to make a case for presentation to these ministries that establishes
that the amendment is required because of a "legal lacuna", i.e., that the law
itself is faulty or imprecise, as opposed to an ineffectiveness of law because of
poor implementation. Following such consensus, a Cabinet note is prepared.
Subsequent to its approval by the Indian Cabinet, the Parliament is required
to vote to approve the amendment.
Such regulation then, is obviously difficult to implement. Further, none of
the actors in this lengthy and drawn out process are disinterested actors, as
they may either hold property through the power of attorney in Delhi, or may
be open to pressure from close associates who do (Agrawal, 1994). However,
this does not by any means imply that the government will be unable to
implement such law. The process of legislation itelf generates a degree of
autonomy in the abstract framing of a question, that to an extent enables
actors to make decisions that do not correspond to immediate material gain.
That degree of autonomy may be related to how clearly the choices are
presented to such actors, and how well they understand the implications of
their decisions.
Epilogue
A THEORY OF LAW AND CONFLICT: WHY FORMAL LEGITIMACY IS
IMPORTANT THOUGH RESIDENTS APPEAR IMMUNE TO DETERRENCE
This story has pointed to a series of apparent paradoxes. Residents demanded
that the government allow conversion of leasehold residential property to
freehold ownership. However, when the government introduced the
leasehold to freehold conversion scheme, few residents chose to convert to
freehold ownership. When confronted with the costs of conversion to
freehold tenure, residents chose not to do so. However, they actively lobbied
for the extension of the government's deadline for conversion. Residents
ignore most leasehold restrictions as the government appears unable to
enforce such law. While residents openly break government law through
unauthorized construction and the non-payment of lease dues, they subvert
lease restrictions on sales by using the power of attorney that is defensible in a
court of law. To understand this apparently contradictory behavior, it is
important to look more closely at the role of government law where non-
compliance is the norm.
I recommended in this thesis that the registration of the power of attorney be
mandated by law to prevent its use for irregular sales transactions. Given the
record of non-compliance to land regulation in New Delhi, the effectiveness
of further legislation could be questioned. Where the state is unable to
enforce compliance as a result of the failure of its deterrence mechanism, it is
not clear what purpose government law serves. Under what conditions then,
is further land regulation appropriate, if urban administration is unable to
enforce such law?
Two theoretical approaches typically explain why people do not obey law. The
instrumental approach assumes that individuals are motivated to non-
compliance as a result of their assessment of the threat of deterrence in
comparison to the benefits they achieve from deviance. 52 In contrast, a
normative approach focuses on non-compliance as a result of public dispute
over the morality and legitimacy of law. Research on the effectiveness of law
has tended to adopt the instrumental view to explain such deviance. As the
history of non-compliance to lease restrictions in New Delhi indicates, law
may be difficult to enforce for certain reasons.
One, law enforcement does not have the ability and resources to detect
deviance. Lease administration has not demonstrated the ability to enforce
restrictions on the non-payment of lease rents or on unauthorized
construction and extensions to leasehold property. Further, the widespread
under-reporting of sales prices in property transactions in both leasehold and
freehold submarkets has so far been beyond urban administration's ability to
detect and enforce.
Two, political compulsions make the enforcement of law unfeasible, or
undermine the autonomy of the law making process. MUD has checked its
enforcement agencies from punitive action in response to unauthorized
construction in residential areas prior to elections by issuing bans on such
checks (Krishna Rao, 1993). These bans have tended to stay in place even in
the period separating elections. Such bans appear to stem from urban
administration's unwillingness to alienate voters by enforcing politically
unpopular legislation. Urban administration's unwillingness to raise ground
rents in the older leaseholds also appears to be motivated by political
exigency.
Three, due legal process itself may frustrate government's attempt to enforce
law. Residents question the legitimacy of the government's role as
"landlord", with regard to government's decision to retain private land in
521 use the term 'deterrence' to mean enforcement of government law or 'formal' law. 'Deviance'
is used here to describe non-compliance to formal law.
public ownership through leasehold tenure. They also question the morality
of regulation that restricts their freedom to benefit from their own property
through the use of lease restrictions. When land law is disputed in normative
terms, organized residents can pit law and governance against each other.53 In
the case of New Delhi, lease restrictions have been difficult to enforce for all
of the above three instrumental reasons.
Residents, however, also question in normative terms the legitimacy and
morality of the government's withholding of property rights through lease
restrictions, such as the right to transfer leasehold property. Though they
found little reason to convert immediately to freehold tenure and proved
they could not be coerced to do so, the right to that option was demanded for
normative reasons. How can such behavior be explained?
A sharp distinction between instrumental and normative motivations as
underlying compliance or non-compliance to law, however, does not capture
the finer aspects of the behavior of people. Nor does it explain the apparent
contradiction in questioning normatively, law that is rarely enforced. The
answer to this paradox must lie in the dynamism of the evolution and
shaping of law.. Other theoretical readings describe the dynamic process of the
evolution and change of law and the action of the state in reaction to peoples'
responses. I introduce these readings into this analysis to illustrate some
aspects of the relationship between people and the state, in order to evolve
my own analysis of the role of formal law under circumstances where the
enforcement of formal law is for various reasons difficult.
According to Moore (1978), formal law that restricts the enjoyment of
particular rights by certain individuals in society may result in these
individuals grouping to contest such regulation. Such organized groupings
5 3 1n suggesting revisions to the method of determining ground rents, a government document
notes, "Today a large number of the revisions made end up in the law courts because of arguments
about land value, and there is untold pressure on officials to reduce their estimates, pressure
that can not always be effectively resisted" (Government of India, 1977: 12).
she terms "social fields".54 Social fields then, are generated by conflict.55 As
social fields are ordered by a set of codes or conventions requiring
conformance, they function as a "legal system", even though conformance to
these codes involves deviance from formal law.56 Such contestation may
cause governance to reconsider the formulation of law because of the failure
of its ability to enforce compliance. Razzaz (1991) shows the transformation of
conflict between formal and non-formal legal systems from a vertical or
hierarchical relationship to a horizontal or non-hierarchical relationship as a
result of the formation of a social field. The ability of the social field to ensure
immunity from deterrence is achieved by the "semi-autonomy" of the social
field (Moore, 1978). A semi-autonomous social field generates rules and
customs internally, but is able to effect its purposes by exploiting the
permeability of authority external to it. The semi-autonomous social field
exerts pressure on the state through the use of the formal legal system, and
through the manipulation of political interests. Conflicting claims between
state and social field then, are gradually transformed from hierarchical or
"vertical" conflict, into conflict that is non-hierachical or "horizontal". Such
5 4 When groups through their organizational arrangements, networks, procedures, and
practices, pose a challenge to the enforcement of law, and cause authority to reconsider its
formulation, they become a "social field". As Razzaz (1991: 8) notes, "Groups organizing to
protest a certain law, an agency, or a policy can be said to be part of a social movement. They
aim to put pressure on the state to introduce, change, or retain elements of governance. But a
social field is more than a movement. Not only can it protest existing rules and regulations, but
it can provide forms of relief from these rules and regulations. Such relief comes in the form of
non-compliance mechanisms and / or alternative rules and regulations."
5 5 The relationship of state to society, and among individuals within society, can be described
by one of conflict. I use conflict here to refer to competing property claims. Bromley (1991: 2)
defines property relations as social relationships that define the property holder "with
respect to something of value ... against all others". Property right is defined by Macpherson
(1978) as claim to use or benefit, that is "enforced by state, by custom or convention or law"
(Macpherson, 1978: 3). As Razzaz (1993: 341) points out, property relations need not always be
protected by legal rights. In the residential leasehold of New Delhi, residents enjoy de facto
rights which are not given to them by government law, such as the right to transfer property.
5 6
"Legal pluralism" is a view of law that does not imply all-encompassing law, but one
"operating within a plurality of ordering mechanisms" (Razzaz, 1991: 4). The framework of
legal pluralism assumes that individuals interact with governmental law as organized social
groupings capable of generating their own codes of conformance that "complement or undermine
governmental law" (Razzaz, 1991: 4).
transformation occurs unless the state shows a continuing willingness and
ability to repress deviance.
I term conflict between state and social field intersystemic conflict. As social
fields are ordered by a set of codes or conventions requiring conformance,
they function as a "legal system". Conflict between state and social field, can
be seen as conflict between distinct legal systems. Intersystemic conflict is used
then, to describe conflict between legal systems.
Such a reading is useful to understanding the nature of property conflicts in
New Delhi. New Delhi's residential leasehold may be seen as a social field. In
New Delhi's residential leasehold, an organized network of residents and
property dealers create a problem for law enforcement through non-
conformance and the development of alternative codes. An organized
network is revealed where residents collaborated with brokers, real estate
agents and lawyers to evolve the power of attorney transaction. One non-
formal code is that allowing transacting parties the use of undeclared incomes
in property transactions to their mutual benefit. Another non-fomal
convention is revealed where lease administration created a problem for
transacting parties by the time it took to process permission for the transfer of
leasehold rights. A non-formal convention allows the buyer to retain a
certain proportion of the transaction amount until such permission,
requested by the buyer in the name of the seller, is received. Other indications
of the operation of an organized non-formal network include the supply of
free information by brokers to allottees of DDA built leasehold housing on
prevailing market rates for comparable housing. Brokers attempt to induce
allottees to sell their housing allotments at the prevailing premium, hoping
to pick up a commission from brokering such a transaction. In such instances,
allottees often receive such letters from brokers even before they receive
official allotment letters from DDA. Brokers obtain for a price the names and
addresses of allottees from sources within DDA.
Governmental intervention in the housing market was subverted by non-
compliance to lease restrictions by organized residents. By the subversion of
such restrictions, the social field of the residential leasehold made the
government reformulate regulation portrayed by the residents as repressive.
The semi-autonomy of the social field is evident in its use of political
pressure to force the government to introduce the freehold conversion
scheme. Residents also appear fully aware that the state cannot easily enforce
infringements to land law. In the case of unauthorized extensions and
construction to leasehold property, residents ignore lease restrictions
knowing that lease administration is rarely in a position to enforce such
regulation. When residents realized that there was inadequate economic
incentive in conversion, they refused again to be coerced by law. This time,
due legal process was used to contest the implementation of law.
With such an understanding, the apparent contradiction displayed by the
response of residents to law that they cannot be coerced into obeying, may
now be better understood. It was pointed earlier, that while lease
administration's inability to enforce lease restrictions causes an instrumental
problem as evidenced by the failure of its deterrence mechanism, such
restrictions are represented by residents in normative terms. Such
representation serves a purpose. When the social field is able to justify non-
compliance in normative terms, it appears that the formal legal system and
political actors begin to support such non-compliance. Housing is often
perceived as a fundamental right, even if not guaranteed by the letter of the
law. As a result, such property conflicts where the right of individuals to
housing is disputed by the state are easier to portray in normative terms.
In the case of New Delhi, some issues portrayed in normative terms were
misrepresented. Residents, for example, claimed that the conversion scheme
for the first time legitimized the power of attorney transaction. As noted in
Chapter 4, two earlier schemes had already offered residents the option to
regularize irregular power of attorney transactions. Residents appear not to
have responded to these two earlier schemes and the third and most recent
option that also allowed them the simultaneous option to convert their
properties to freehold tenure. As already pointed out, their lack of interest
appears to stem from two primarily instrumental reasons. First, the power of
attorney allows them fully defensible right to property, while ensuring them
additional additional economic advantage over regular sales transactions.
Second, most residents find the total direct and indirect costs of conversion to
freehold tenure not justified by the advantages that it brings.57
As a result of the organization of individuals into a social field with its own
operative codes, conflict between government law and the non-formal legal
system transforms over time from hierarchical or vertical conflict into a non-
hierarchical or horizontal relationship. Such transformation implies that
formal legitimacy should be superfluous. However, in the case of New Delhi,
at least 90 percent of leasehold properties change hands through the power of
attorney.58 Nearly all irregular leasehold property transfers, therefore are
conducted within the domain of formal law. While leasehold residents chose
to break the law by not paying ground rents, and ignored lease restrictions on
unauthorized construction, they chose to devise a route defensible in a court
of law for the transfer of leasehold rights.
When is government law then, important?
It is necessary to differentiate between conflicts among legal systems from that
internal to a legal system to explain why mechanisms that are supportable by
formal law are important to deviance in the case of New Delhi. A reading
that represents social fields as homogeneous entities ignores a second kind of
conflict, that between the individuals who form the social field. It was noted
in Chapter 3 that competing property claims between residents of New
Delhi's residential leasehold are common.59 Formal law then, can and does,
5 7 Roy (1993), relates the response to the conversion scheme to the state of the real estate
market. The implication is that freehold conversion increases economic value of property to the
buyer when transfer of propery takes place. Property brokers note that in many cases where
freehold conversion is sought, it is the buyer who files the application for conversion after
acquiring the property. An article in the Economic Times (9/13/92), reports a temporary slump
in New Delhi's real estate market. This may partially explain why applications for
conversion are so low.
5 8 Gambhir (1993), claims 99.9% of all leasehold transfers take place through the power of
attorney.
5 9 Moore (1978: 55) notes, "The semi-autonomous social field has rule making capacities, and
the means to induce or coerce compliance; but it is simultaneously set in a larger social matrix
affect and invade the social field at the invitation of the individuals that
comprise it. These individuals in New Delhi contest their rights to property
in the domain of formal law. This domain is represented by the municipal
courts. I have said that the need for legality shown in the use of the power of
attorney transfer anticipates such conflict.
I use the term intrasystemic conflict to describe such conflict within a legal
system. I use intrasystemic conflict here to refer to conflict within the non-
formal legal system of the social field. Such a reading may enable an
understanding of the need for formal legitimacy when for all practical
purposes residents are immune to deterrence.
When are individuals vulnerable to intrasystemic conflict?
Black (1976: 6) indicates that as social control loosens, the need for formal law
increases. Where, as in the resettlement colonies, residents are relatively
homogeneous in terms of ethnicity, a strong level of social cohesion is
visible. However, as shown in Chapter 3, this cohesion shows signs of
weakening, as intergenerational transfer of property occurs and people's
attitudes about social relations change.
One leasehold resident noted that his parents had considered conversion to
freehold tenure to ease and render unambiguous intergenerational transfer.
After considering the costs and benefits of the move, they had decided not to
convert to freehold ownership. The interviewed lessee was an only son. That
he would face no competing claim to his father's property may have played
some part in that decision.
At times of transfer of property, then, enforceable claim to property acquires
particular importance. Where the state can be manipulated to provide that
enforceable claim, there appears to be no need for non-formal enforcement
mechanisms. Such seems to be the case in New Delhi.
which can and does, affect and invade it, sometimes at the invitation of persons inside it,
sometimes at its own instance".
Enforceable right or legal claim to property, may have other value. In the case
of an economic property transaction between individuals, such defensible
right is a valuable benefit to the buyer. The widespread use of the power of
attorney for property transfers indicates the preference that residents have for
mechanisms supportable by formal law.
Conflicts between individuals unrelated to intergenerational transfer or
economic transactions may also occur, that requires resolution outside of the
non-formal legal system. Non-formal legal systems need not always be 'just'
or 'neutral'. In most cases of intrasystemic conflicts, some individuals are
inherently or by familiarity, endowed with greater advantage over others by
existing networks of control. The less privileged, then, may not receive a 'fair'
hearing by a non-formal legal system.
Residents chose not to convert to freehold tenure when confronted with the
costs of regularizing ownership. As long as the power of attorney protects
individuals from intrasystemic conflict by allowing access to the courts of law,
a large proportion of property transactions will continue to be irregular. As a
study of the power of attorney reveals, formal legitimacy is of critical
importance to support irregular property transfers. It is to intrasystemic
conflict that the modifications to the General Power of Attorney appears
addressed, and it is to the insecurity caused by such conflict that law and
governance must direct attention towards, to prevent deviance from land
regulation.
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